Below is the Supreme Court's final opinion on Brown v.
Board of Education, which overruled Plessy v. Ferguson, the
1896 ruling that established the “separate but equal” doctrine in education and
public facilities. Certain terms, while appropriate in the 1950s, are no longer
considered standard usage.
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas
Decided May 17, 1954
Mr. Chief Justice Warren delivered the opinion of the
Court.
These cases...are premised on different facts and
different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies their
consideration together in this consolidated opinion.
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through
their legal representatives, seek the aid of the courts in obtaining admission
to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated basis. In each
instance, they have been denied admission to schools attended by white children
under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This
segregation was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the
laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. In each of the cases other than the
Delaware case, a three-judge federal district court denied relief to the
plaintiffs on the so-called “separate but equal” doctrine announced by this
Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537. Under that doctrine, equality of
treatment is accorded when the races are provided substantially equal
facilities, even though these facilities be separate. In the Delaware case, the
Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but ordered that the
plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the
Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools
are not “equal” and cannot be made “equal,” and that hence they are deprived of
the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious importance of the
question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. Argument was heard in the 1952
Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the
Court.
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868. It covered
exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress, ratification by the
states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of
proponents and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own
investigation convince us that, although these sources cast some light, it is
not enough to resolve the problem with which we are faced. At best, they are
inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly
intended them to remove all legal distinctions among “all persons born or
naturalized in the United States.” Their opponents, just as certainly, were
antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments and wished them
to have the most limited effect. What others in Congress and the state
legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the
Amendment's history, with respect to segregated schools, is the status of public
education at that time. In the South, the movement toward free common schools,
supported by general taxation, had not yet taken hold. Education of white
children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of Negroes was
almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact,
any education of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in
contrast, many Negroes have achieved outstanding success in the arts and
sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It is true that
public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the
North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored
in the congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public
education did not approximate those existing today. The curriculum was usually
rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in rural areas; the school term was
but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school attendance was
virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be
so little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended
effect on public education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the
Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its adoption, the Court interpreted
it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro race. The
doctrine of “separate but equal” did not make its appearance in this Court until
1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over
half a century. In this Court, there have been six cases involving the “separate
but equal” doctrine in the field of public education. In Cumming v. Board of
Education of Richmond County, 175 U.S. 528, and Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78,
the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. In more recent cases,
all on the graduate school level, inequality was found in that specific benefits
enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational
qualifications. State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337; Sipuel
v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631; Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637. In none of these
cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro
plaintiff. And in Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved
decision on the question whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held inapplicable
to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly
presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are findings below that the
Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being equalized,
with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers,
and other “tangible” factors. Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro and white schools involved in
each of the cases. We must look instead to the effect of segregation itself on
public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock
back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v.
Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only
in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these
plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these
days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation
of children in public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the
physical facilities and other “tangible” factors may be equal, deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe
that it does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a
segregated law school for Negroes could not provide them equal educational
opportunities, this Court relied in large part on “those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law
school.” In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in
requiring that a Negro admitted to a white graduate school be treated like all
other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: “... his ability to
study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession.” Such considerations apply with added force to
children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. The effect of this separation on
their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in the Kansas case
by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro
plaintiffs:
“Segregation of white and colored children in public
schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is
greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the
races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation
with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational
and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some of the
benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school system.”
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by
modern authority. Any language in Plessy v. Fersugon contrary to this finding is
rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of “separate but equal” has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and others
similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. This deposition makes unnecessary any
discussion whether such segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Because these are class actions, because of the wide
applicability of this decision, and because of the great variety of local
conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems of
considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief
was necessarily subordinated to the primary question—the constitutionality of
segregation in public education. We have now announced that such segregation is
a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In order that we may have the full
assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will be restored to
the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument ... The
Attorney General of the United States is again invited to participate. The
Attorneys General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public
education will also be permitted to appear as amici curiae upon request
to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs by October 1,
1954.
It is so ordered.
Source: National Archives and Records
Administration
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