Suez Crisis
Suez Crisis, international
confrontation along the Suez Canal in 1956 that pitted Egypt against the
combined forces of Israel, Britain, and France. The crisis, which was provoked
by Egypt’s nationalization of the strategic waterway, triggered the diplomatic
intervention of both the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR). It was finally defused through the placement of a United
Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in the canal zone.
The Suez crisis began as a result of the increasingly
independent and assertive leadership role played by Egyptian prime minister
(later president) Gamal Abdel Nasser. When he came to power in 1954, Nasser
followed a pro-Western diplomatic course. He soon diverged from this path,
however, emerging as a prominent figure in the Nonaligned Movement, an
association of countries that made no formal commitment to either Cold War
bloc—the West, led by the United States, or the East, led by the USSR—while
often seeking the support of both sides. In September 1955 Nasser arranged to
purchase large amounts of Soviet weaponry from Czechoslovakia, a Communist
country; at the same time, he secured promises from the U.S. and British
governments to help fund a huge construction project on the Nile River, the
Aswān High Dam.
The U.S. secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, was not
pleased by Nasser’s simultaneous overtures toward an Eastern-bloc nation, and he
successfully maneuvered to block the funding of the Aswān dam project. Nasser
responded in July 1956 by nationalizing the Suez Canal, transferring ownership
of the company that controlled the daily operations of the canal from its
British and French owners to the Egyptian government. He declared that he would
use the company’s profits of $25 million per year as an alternative source of
funding for the dam. Nasser defended this action by stating that the canal was
Egyptian property, and he pledged to compensate the company’s shareholders and
to keep the waterway open to the shipping of all nations (though Israel remained
excluded under an earlier Egyptian policy).
The British and French governments found the prospect of
losing control of the canal unacceptable, because the waterway provided a
strategic conduit for huge amounts of oil shipped from the Middle East to
Europe. Britain and France demanded that Nasser back down, and when diplomacy
failed, they turned to Israel for a military ally. Israel at this time was
already considering military action against Egypt. Since 1949 Egypt had
forbidden the passage of Israeli ships and any ships carrying cargo to or from
Israel through the Suez Canal. Since 1951 it had blockaded the Strait of Tiran
at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, completely cutting off Israeli access to the
Red Sea. Also, in previous years, guerrillas had staged numerous raids on Israel
from the Egyptian-held Gaza Strip.
After several months of secret planning with Britain and
France, Israel initiated what would be known as the Suez-Sinai War by invading
the Sinai Peninsula on October 29, 1956. In one day, the Israeli forces swept
across the Sinai to within a few miles of the Suez Canal. On October 30, as
planned, Britain and France issued an ultimatum demanding that both Israeli and
Egyptian forces withdraw from the Suez Canal so that a combined British and
French military contingent could establish control along the length of the
canal. Nasser refused to comply, and on October 31 British and French forces
bombed Egyptian military bases, destroying much of the Egyptian air force on the
ground. The Egyptian army in the Sinai was routed, and within a week the
Israelis controlled almost the entire peninsula. British and French forces began
to occupy the canal. In retaliation, Nasser ordered the sinking of 40 ships in
the Suez Canal, effectively blocking the waterway.
The United States and the USSR were both caught off guard
by these developments, since their attention had been focused on the
anti-Communist uprising underway since late October in Hungary. Both superpowers
demanded an immediate cease-fire along the canal. Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchev threatened to use long-range rockets in support of the Egyptian army,
while the U.S. government vowed to block all further oil shipments from South
America to Europe. This combined pressure, coupled with a strongly worded
cease-fire resolution rushed through the UN with the support of both
superpowers, forced the British, French, and Israeli governments to relent. They
withdrew their forces and agreed to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force in
the canal zone. By the end of December 1956, therefore, the Suez Canal and the
Sinai Peninsula had been restored to Egyptian control, and Nasser emerged as an
Arab nationalist hero. While Israel was not granted access to the Suez Canal, it
did regain free use of the Strait of Tiran in return for withdrawing from the
Gaza Strip in early 1957.
The long-term significance of this crisis was threefold.
First, it gave a graphic example of the newly assertive attitude animating many
so-called Third World nations, which would no longer be content to follow the
demands of their former colonial masters. Second, it showed that the two Cold
War superpowers would intervene decisively—despite their ideological rivalry—to
curb what they perceived as dangerous and unnecessary conflicts among third
parties. Finally, it demonstrated that the UN could act effectively in those
instances when the United States and the USSR pursued the same goal and ceased
to block its initiatives from within.
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