I | INTRODUCTION |
Iran, officially the Islamic Republic of Iran, country
in southwestern Asia, located on the northeastern shore of the Persian Gulf. One
of the world's most mountainous countries, Iran contains Mount Damāvand, the
highest peak in Asia west of the Himalayas. The country’s population, while
ethnically and linguistically diverse, is almost entirely Muslim. For centuries,
the region has been the center of the Shia branch of Islam (see Shia
Islam). Iran ranks among the world’s leaders in its reserves of oil and natural
gas. As is the case in other countries in the petroleum-rich Persian Gulf
region, the export of oil has dominated Iran’s economy since the early 20th
century.
In the 6th century bc the territory of present-day Iran was
the center of the Persian Empire, the world’s preeminent power at that time. For
more than 2,000 years, the region’s inhabitants have referred to it by the name
Iran, derived from the Aryan tribes who settled the area long ago. However,
until 1935, when the Iranian ruler demanded that the name Iran be used, the
English-speaking world knew the country as Persia, a legacy of the Greeks who
named the region after its most important province, Pars (present-day Fārs).
Iran was a monarchy ruled by a shah, or king, almost without interruption
from 1501 until 1979, when a yearlong popular revolution led by the Shia clergy
culminated in the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic
republic. See Islamic Revolution of Iran.
Iran lies at the easternmost edge of the
geographic and cultural region known as the Middle East. The country is bordered
on the north by Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Turkmenistan; on the
east by Afghanistan and Pakistan; on the south by the Gulf of Oman, the Strait
of Hormuz, and the Persian Gulf; and on the west by Iraq and Turkey. Iran’s
capital and largest city is Tehrān, located in the northern part of the
country.
II | LAND AND RESOURCES |
Iran is the second largest country in the
Middle East, after Saudi Arabia. It extends over a total area of 1,648,000 sq km
(636,300 sq mi). The country is roughly triangular in shape, with its longest
side extending in a slightly outward arc for 2,500 km (1,600 mi) from the border
with Turkey in the northwest to the border with Pakistan in the southeast. The
third point of the triangle lies in the northeast, about halfway along Iran’s
border with Turkmenistan. Iran’s greatest extent from north to south is 1,600 km
(1,000 mi) and from east to west is 1,700 km (1,100 mi).
A | Natural Regions |
Iran’s interior plateaus are almost
completely surrounded by mountains. The main mountain system, the Zagros
Mountains, cuts across the country for more than 1,600 km (1,000 mi) from
northwest to southeast. With the exception of the Khūzestān coastal plain, which
extends from the northern reaches of the Persian Gulf, the Zagros Mountains
occupy all of western Iran. The central part of the range averages more than 340
km (210 mi) in width. Many peaks of the Zagros exceed 4,000 m (12,000 ft) in
elevation; the highest is Zard Kūh (4,547 m/14,918 ft). Peaks rising above 2,300
m (7,500 ft) capture considerable moisture, which percolates down to the
lower-lying basins as groundwater. These basins, ranging from about 1,200 to
1,500 m (about 4,000 to 5,000 ft) in elevation, contain fertile soil that
traditionally has sustained diverse and intensive crop cultivation.
In Iran’s northern reaches, a steep,
narrow mountain range, the Elburz Mountains, rims the entire southern coast of
the Caspian Sea. This range extends more than 600 km (400 mi) in length and
averages about 100 km (about 60 mi) in width. The country's highest peak, Mount
Damāvand (5,610 m/18,406 ft), lies in the central part of the range. Several
other peaks of the Elburz Mountains exceed 3,600 m (12,000 ft). The northern
slopes of the range receive considerable rainfall throughout the year and
support forests. A fertile coastal plain averaging 24 km (15 mi) in width lies
between the Caspian Sea and the mountains. East of the Elburz Mountains is a
series of parallel mountain ranges with elevations of 2,400 to 2,700 m (8,000 to
9,000 ft). These ranges are interspersed with many narrow, arable valleys.
Several low mountain ridges, generally referred to as the eastern highlands, run
along Iran’s eastern border.
Within this mountainous rim lies a series
of basins known collectively as the central plateau. They include the Dasht-e
Kavir, a huge salt-encrusted desert in north central Iran; the Dasht-e Lūt, a
sand-and-pebble desert in the southeast; and several fertile oases.
The mountains of Iran constitute an active
earthquake zone, and numerous minor earthquakes occur each year. Major
earthquakes causing great loss of life and property damage also occur
periodically. During the 18th century earthquakes twice leveled Tabrīz, the
principal city in the northwest, killing at least 40,000 people on each
occasion. Several severe earthquakes resulting in thousands of deaths have
occurred since the mid-20th century. A devastating earthquake centered in the
fault zone where the Elburz and Zagros mountains intersect in northwestern Iran
killed an estimated 37,000 people in June 1990. A December 2003 earthquake in
southern Iran destroyed much of the ancient city of Bam and killed more than
30,000 people. Several of Iran's highest mountains are volcanic cones; only
Mount Damāvand and Kūh-e Taftān in southeastern Iran are active volcanoes, both
periodically emitting gases near their summits.
B | Rivers and Lakes |
Nearly all of Iran’s numerous rivers are
relatively short, shallow streams unsuitable for navigation. The country’s only
navigable river, the Kārūn, flows through the city of Ahvāz in the southwest.
Most rivers rise in the mountainous regions and drain into the interior basins.
Since ancient times, the region’s inhabitants have used the rivers for
irrigation. Dams constructed in the 20th century on the Āb-e Dez, Karkheh,
Kārūn, Sefid Rud, and other rivers have expanded the area under irrigation and
also have provided a principal source of hydroelectricity. Three rivers form
portions of Iran's international boundaries. The Aras River lies along the
border with Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Atrek River borders Turkmenistan, and
the Shatt al Arab, also known as the Arvandrud River, is part of the border with
Iraq. Iran also shares the Caspian Sea, the world's largest inland body of
water, with four other countries. Several smaller saltwater lakes lie entirely
within Iran; the largest is Lake Urmia in the northwest. A few small freshwater
lakes exist in high mountain valleys.
C | Coastline |
More than half of Iran's international
border of 4,430 km (2,750 mi) is coastline, including 740 km (460 mi) along the
Caspian Sea in the north and 1,700 km (1,100 mi) along the Persian Gulf and
adjacent Gulf of Oman in the south. Both the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf
have important ports and contain extensive underwater deposits of oil and
natural gas. Iran's largest harbor, Bandar-e ‘Abbās, is located on the Strait of
Hormuz, the narrow passage separating the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of
Oman.
D | Plant and Animal Life |
Although more than 10,000 plant species
have been identified in Iran, the natural vegetation in most of the country has
been uprooted and replaced by cultivated crops or pastures. Natural forests
consisting of beech, oak, other deciduous trees, and conifers grow in parts of
the Elburz Mountains. Some regions of higher elevation in the Zagros Mountains
contain wooded areas consisting primarily of oak. Wild fruit trees, including
almond, pear, pomegranate, and walnut, grow in both the Elburz and Zagros
mountains. In the more arid central part of the country, wild pistachio and
other drought-resistant trees grow in areas that have not been disturbed by
human activity. Tamarisk and other salt-tolerant bushes grow along the margins
of the Dasht-e Kavir.
A wide variety of native mammals, reptiles,
birds, and insects inhabit Iran. Many species of mammals—including wolves,
foxes, bears, mountain goats, red mountain sheep, rabbits, and gerbils—continue
to thrive. Others—including Caspian tigers, Caspian seals, desert onagers, three
species of deer, gazelles, and lynx—are endangered despite the establishment of
special wildlife refuge areas and other government programs initiated to protect
them. Some 323 species of birds inhabit Iran; more than 200 species are
migratory birds that spend part of the year in other countries.
E | Natural Resources |
Iran's extensive petroleum and natural gas
deposits are located primarily in the southwestern province of Khūzestān and in
the Persian Gulf. Iran also has one of the world's largest reserves of copper;
deposits are located throughout the country, but the major lode lies in the
central region between the cities of Yazd and Kermān. This region also serves as
a center for the mining of bauxite, coal, iron ore, lead, and zinc. Additional
coal mines operate throughout the Elburz Mountains; iron ore mines also exist
near Zanjān in the northwest, near Mashhad in the northeast, and on Hormuz
Island in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran also has valuable deposits of chromite,
gold, manganese, silver, tin, and tungsten, as well as various gemstones, such
as amber, agate, lapis lazuli, and turquoise.
Although about one-third of Iran’s total
land area is cultivable, only 9.8 percent is under cultivation. An additional 6
percent of the total land is used for pasture. Forested areas, found primarily
in the Elburz Mountains and the higher elevations of the Zagros Mountains, have
declined slightly in recent decades and account for 6.7 percent of the total
land area.
F | Climate |
Iran’s varied landscape produces several
different climates. On the northern edge of the country, the Caspian coastal
plain, with an average elevation at or below sea level, remains humid all year.
Winter temperatures rarely fall below freezing, and maximum summer temperatures
rarely exceed 29°C (85°F). Annual precipitation averages 650 mm (26 in) in the
eastern part of the plain (Māzandarān Province) and more than 1,900 mm (75 in)
in the western part (Gilān Province).
At higher elevations to the west,
settlements in the Zagros Mountain basins experience lower temperatures. These
areas are subject to severe winters, with average daily temperatures below
freezing, and warm summers, averaging 25°C (77°F) in the northwest and 33°C
(91°F) in the central and southern Zagros. Annual precipitation, including
snowfall, averages more than 280 mm (11 in) at higher elevations. Most
precipitation falls between October and April.
The central plateau region also experiences
regional variations. In Tehrān, located at an elevation of 1,200 m (3,900 ft) on
the northern edge of the plateau, the temperature averages 2°C (36°F) in January
and 29°C (85°F) in July. The city receives an average of 230 mm (9 in) of
precipitation annually. The arid basins of central and eastern Iran generally
receive less than 200 mm (8 in) of precipitation per year. Yazd, for example,
averages less than 70 mm (3 in) of precipitation. Its winters are cool, but
temperatures almost never fall below freezing; summers are very hot, averaging
38°C (100°F) for most of July and August.
The coastal plains along the Persian Gulf
and the Gulf of Oman in southern Iran have mild winters, with average January
temperatures ranging from 7° to 18°C (45° to 64°F) in Khūzestān Province;
average temperatures are even higher in Bandar-e ‘Abbās on the Strait of Hormuz.
Summers are very humid and hot, with temperatures exceeding 48°C (119°F) during
July in the interior areas. Annual precipitation ranges from 145 mm to 355 mm (6
to 14 in) in this region.
G | Environmental Issues |
Iran's rapid urbanization and
industrialization have caused major environmental problems. Air pollution,
primarily from automobile and factory emissions, has become a serious problem in
Tehrān and other large cities. A rising incidence of respiratory illnesses
prompted the city governments of Tehrān and Arāk, southwest of the capital, to
institute air pollution control programs. These programs aim to reduce gradually
the amount of harmful chemicals released into the atmosphere. Pollution of the
Caspian Sea has increased substantially since the early 1990s, reaching levels
that threaten sturgeon and other fish that sustain the Iranian fishing industry.
Although Iran enforces stringent controls on the dumping of municipal and
industrial wastes into Caspian waters within its territorial limits, the other
countries that border the Caspian Sea do not control pollution in the northern
two-thirds of the lake. Iran has urged these countries to sign a binding
international agreement for cleaning up the Caspian Sea and preserving its water
quality.
III | PEOPLE AND SOCIETY |
The population of Iran was estimated at
65,875,223 in 2008. This figure is more than double the 1975 population of
33,379,000. Between 1956 and 1986 Iran's population grew at a rate of more than
3 percent per year. The growth rate began to decline in the mid-1980s after the
government initiated a major population control program. By 2008 the growth rate
had declined to 0.8 percent per year, with a birth rate of 17 per 1,000 persons
and a death rate of 6 per 1,000. Nevertheless, Iran’s population remains young:
About 55 percent of Iranians were 24 years of age or younger in 2003.
Overall population density in 2008 was 40
persons per sq km (104 per sq mi). Northern and western Iran are more densely
populated than the arid eastern half of the country, where population density in
the extensive desert regions is only 1 percent of the national average. In 2005,
68 percent of the population lived in urban areas. About 99 percent of rural
Iranians resided in villages. Only 240,000 were nomads (people without
permanent residences who migrate seasonally), down from 2 million in 1966.
Tehrān, the country’s capital and largest
city, serves as the main administrative, commercial, educational, financial,
industrial, and publishing center. Iran's other major cities include Mashhad, a
manufacturing and commercial center in the northeast and the site of the
country's most important religious shrine; Eşfahān, a manufacturing center for
central Iran with several architecturally significant public buildings from the
17th and 18th centuries; Tabrīz, the main industrial and commercial center of
the northwest; Shīrāz, a manufacturing center in the south near the ruins of the
ancient Persian capital of Persepolis; and Ahvāz, the principal commercial and
manufacturing center in the southwestern oil region.
A | Ethnic Groups |
Iran’s population is made up of numerous
ethnic groups. Persians migrated to the region from Central Asia beginning in
the 7th century bc and established
the first Persian empire in 550 bc. They are the largest ethnic group,
and include such groups as the Gilaki, who live in Gilān Province, and the
Mazandarani, who live in Māzandarān Province. Accounting for about 60 percent of
the total population, Persians live in cities throughout the country, as well as
in the villages of central and eastern Iran. Two groups closely related to the
Persians both ethnically and linguistically are the Kurds and the Lurs. The
Kurds, who make up about 7 percent of the population, reside primarily in the
Zagros Mountains near the borders with Iraq and Turkey. The Lurs account for 2
percent of the population; they inhabit the central Zagros region. Turkic tribes
began migrating into northwestern Iran in the 11th century, gradually changing
the ethnic composition of the region so that by the late 20th century East
Azerbaijan Province was more than 90 percent Turkish. Since the early 1900s,
Azeris (a Turkic group) have been migrating to most large cities in Iran,
especially Tehrān. Azeris and other Turkic peoples together account for about 25
percent of Iran’s inhabitants. The remainder of the population comprises small
communities of Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Baluch, Georgians, Pashtuns, and
others.
B | Language |
Modern Persian is the official language
of Iran. An ancient literary language, Persian was written in the Pahlavi script
before the Arab conquest in the 7th century. A new form written in the Arabic
script developed during the 9th and 10th centuries; this is the basis of the
Modern Persian language used today (see Persian Language; Arabic
Language: Arabic Script). As recently as 1950 there were several distinct
dialects of spoken Persian, but due to the spread of public education and
broadcast media, a standard spoken form, with minor regional accents, has
evolved. Important languages of minority groups that have their own publications
and broadcast programs include Azeri (a Turkic language of the Altaic family),
Kurdish, Arabic, and Armenian.
C | Religion |
Jafari Shia Islam has been the official
religion of Iran since the 16th century. Followers of Shia Islam disagree with
Sunni Muslims (see Sunni Islam), who form the majority of Muslims in the
Middle East and the Islamic world, over the rightful succession to the Prophet
Muhammad, the founder of Islam. Iran’s 1979 constitution assigns to the Shia
clergy important political leadership roles in the government. An estimated 93
percent of all Iranians follow Shia Islam, and nearly all are members of the
Jafari group. Because Jafaris believe there are 12 legitimate successors, or
imams, to Muhammad, they are often called Twelvers. Most of the remaining
population belongs to other Islamic denominations, primarily Sunni Islam. In
towns where there are mixed Muslim communities, religious tensions have surfaced
frequently, especially during major religious observances. Sufism, or Islamic
mysticism, is popular among Shia and Sunni Muslims seeking spiritual
interpretations of religion. Iran also has small communities of Armenian and
Assyrian Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians. The Baha’i faith, which originated
in Iran during the 19th century, has several thousand secret followers, even
though it has been a target of official persecution since the Islamic republic
came to power in 1979.
D | Education |
Public primary education was introduced
in Iran after the country’s first constitution was drafted in 1906.
Predominantly an urban system, it expanded only gradually and did not include
secondary education until 1925. At the time of the 1979 Islamic revolution, only
60 percent of Iranian children of primary school age, and less than 50 percent
of those of secondary school age, were enrolled in public schools; overall adult
literacy was only 48 percent. Since 1979 the government has given a high
priority to education, with programs focusing on adult literacy, new school
construction, and expansion of public colleges and other institutes of higher
education. By 2005 literacy for all Iranians aged 15 and older had reached 81.3
percent. The literacy rate was higher for males (87.2 percent) than for females
(75.2 percent); the rate was also higher in cities than in rural areas.
Both the public education system and an
expanding private school system consist of a five-year primary school cycle, a
three-year middle school cycle, and a four-year high school cycle. Education is
compulsory for children between the ages of 6 and 10. All villages now have at
least a primary school, and 92 percent of primary school-aged children were
enrolled in school in 2002–2003. Dropout rates begin during middle school and
increase significantly during high school. In 2002–2003 only 78 percent of
secondary school-aged children were enrolled in secondary school. Dropout rates
are significantly higher in rural areas, where there is a shortage of high
schools within easy commuting distance. Although educational opportunities for
girls improved after the revolution, the dropout rate is still higher for girls.
Although 90 percent of girls of eligible age attended primary school, only 75
percent attended secondary school.
Iran has more than 30 tuition-free public
universities and many other institutes of higher learning. These include medical
universities and specialized colleges providing instruction in teacher training,
agriculture, and other subjects. In all, only 21 percent of Iranians of relevant
age were enrolled in institutions of higher learning in 2002–2003. Tehrān serves
as a center for higher education, with more than 15 universities and numerous
colleges and institutes. Other important universities are located in Hamedān,
Eşfahān, Shīrāz, and Tabrīz. In addition to the public system, Iran has a
private system of higher education that consists of theological colleges and the
Islamic Free University, which has been developing campuses in cities throughout
the country since its establishment in the late 1980s.
E | Social Structure |
Iranian society in the early 20th century
consisted of a narrow ruling elite (the Qajar dynasty monarch and his extended
family, court-appointed officials in Tehrān and provincial capitals, major
landlords, and chiefs of large nomadic tribes); a middle tier, including urban
bazaar merchants, the Shia clergy, and artisans; and a large, poor segment
comprising mostly share-cropping peasants and nomads but also some town dwellers
engaged in service-sector trades. Following the overthrow of the Qajar dynasty
in 1925, Reza Shah Pahlavi implemented wide-ranging economic development
programs that stimulated the industrialization and urbanization of the country.
These changes led to the emergence of two new, urban social groups: a middle
class of professionals and technocrats (technical experts) and a working class
engaged in manual and industrial labor. Reza Shah’s son and successor, Mohammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi, continued the development programs, and the two new social
groups gradually expanded.
By the late 1970s, however, the
professional and technocratic middle class had divided into secular and
religious factions. Both groups contributed to the overthrow of the shah in
1979; the secular group objected to the autocratic rule and economic corruption
of the monarchy, while the religious group feared that the shah’s embrace of the
West threatened traditional Islamic morality. The religious middle class, in
alliance with the Shia clergy and under the leadership of Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, gradually split from the secular middle class and consolidated power
after the revolution. This group pursued an accelerated industrialization
program, causing further expansion of the middle class.
F | Way of Life |
Codes of personal conduct and group
behavior that far predate the Islamic conquest of the 7th century continue to
influence Iranian culture. Enduring cultural values include obligations to
extended family, hospitality toward guests, and striving to act morally.
However, social changes during the 20th century affected these values. For
example, the new professional middle class began living in nuclear family
(consisting only of father, mother, and children), rather than extended family,
residences. Busy lifestyles in large cities and eight-hour workdays proved
incompatible with the custom of spontaneously inviting friends home for a meal.
The increase in educational opportunities for girls since 1979 raised
expectations among women for work opportunities outside the home. The rapid
expansion of the middle class since the revolution has stimulated the growth of
a consumer society in which various material goods are perceived as status
symbols.
The 1979 revolution was heavily imbued
with religious rhetoric. Its leaders subsequently banned many forms of
entertainment that they considered sinful, including casinos, nightclubs and
dance halls, movies that featured nudity or sexual themes, and musical genres
such as pop and rock. For more wholesome entertainment, the government
encouraged Iranian traditional and Western classical music, new films
emphasizing family values, and recreational and sports facilities segregated by
gender. Both men and women were required to dress modestly in public. For women,
modest dress, or hejab, meant covering their hair with a scarf and having
no exposed flesh other than their hands and faces; for men it meant wearing long
trousers and long-sleeve shirts.
The population gradually adapted to the
various restrictions and continued to enjoy prerevolutionary leisure activities
such as attending sports events, especially soccer, the national pastime. The
general decline in public entertainment venues contributed to an increase in
home entertaining. Popular foods at such gatherings include fresh seasonal
fruit, greens, and nuts. Also popular are traditional Iranian dishes of steamed
rice served with minced lamb and chicken kebabs cooked over charcoal or with
traditional stews made with simmered meat, fruits, legumes, and spices. Tea is
always served to guests in the home and the workplace; fruit juices and
carbonated beverages also are popular. The sale and consumption of alcoholic
beverages has been prohibited since 1979, although there is a black market for
bootleg vodka and wine. Other general recreational and leisure activities
include hiking, picnicking, watching television and videos, and making seasonal
visits to Caspian Sea beaches and various historical sites and religious
shrines. In large cities, shopping and attending movies, concerts, theaters,
museums, and poetry readings also are popular.
G | Social Issues |
Poverty is a major social problem in
Iran, but the government provides low-income families with various subsidies for
food, fuel, and utilities. Health-care services remain inadequate in rural
areas. Another serious social problem is the widespread recreational use of
illegal drugs, especially among young men, despite the government’s heavy use of
the print and broadcast media to educate the public about the harmful effects of
addiction and drug-related crime.
H | Social Services |
Public social services in Iran include a
national health insurance program that provides free or low-cost health care in
government-run city hospitals and village clinics. A social security program,
funded by a special tax on wages and salaries, provides pensions for retired
public sector employees and some private sector employees. It also provides
survivor benefits to widows of deceased retirees and veterans killed in action,
disability payments to family heads incapacitated by work-related injuries or
catastrophic illnesses, and special payments for minor-aged children of deceased
workers. Numerous private organizations also provide various social services for
low-income people.
IV | ARTS |
Iranian art forms have a long tradition and
distinctive style, as exemplified in architecture, carpets, ceramics, metalware,
painting, and woodwork. Government patronage of artists dates from more
than 2,000 years ago. Aesthetic ideals predating the Islamic conquest of the 7th
century, such as stylized figural representation and geometric shapes,
influenced the evolution of art in Iran during the early Islamic period
(650-1220). Examples of elaborately decorated bronze, ceramic, gold, and silver
objects from this period are preserved in museums. Persian poetry also developed
during this time, and works by several poets of the period are considered
classic literature. During the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), considered a golden
age for Iranian art, miniature painting and architecture reached their highest
point of development. In the 20th century Iranian artists and writers began
experimenting with new styles and techniques, incorporating European and East
Asian influences into their work.
A | Literature |
From its beginnings in the 9th century,
Modern Persian literature was dominated by poetry. Important poets of the 9th
through the 12th century include Rudaki, noted for his qasidas
(panegyrics, or written works of praise); Firdawsi, who wrote the famous epic of
pre-Islamic Iran, the Shahnameh (completed in 1010); Omar Khayyam, author
of the famous Rubáiyát; and Nezami, who wrote the collection known as
Khamseh (Quintet). Persian poetry reached its height in the 13th and 14th
centuries with mystical poets Jalal al-Din Rumi, Sa’di, and Hafiz. Subsequently,
Persian literature declined, and for nearly five centuries both poetry and prose
remained uninspired imitation of past masters. A literary revival began in the
late 19th century and has continued to the present. Fiction, especially in the
form of the short story, has emerged as a new and important genre. Modern
Iranian writers include Mashid Amirshahi, Simin Daneshvar, Ismail Fassih,
Houshang Golshiri, and Moshen Makhmalbaf (who also directs films). Writers may
explore many themes that were prohibited prior to the 1979 revolution, such as
political freedom, rebellion against authority, satire of monarchy, and
fictional accounts of suffering under the Pahlavi dynasty. However, since the
revolution, works deemed to be antireligious have been banned. See also
Persian Literature.
B | Art and Architecture |
Persian art and architecture first
developed in the time of Persian king Cyrus the Great (6th century bc) and experienced a renaissance during
the Sassanid dynasty (ad 224-651).
After the Islamic conquest, the mosque became the major building type, and
several new styles of painting developed and thrived during the Safavid era
(1501-1722).
The 1979 revolution ushered in a period
of renewed creativity in fine and applied arts. The proliferation of exhibits
sponsored by the Ministry of Culture, by various museums, and by private
galleries inspired artistic creativity in mediums as diverse as calligraphy,
graphic art, painting, photography, pottery, and sculpture. The boom in public
and private construction following the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) provided new
opportunities for architects. Most new buildings have tended to be updated
versions of the structures they replaced. Some younger architects have been
experimenting with designs that incorporate traditional architectural motifs
into contemporary buildings. In textile arts, younger designers continue to
experiment with new patterns and color schemes for hand-knotted carpets and
woven coverings. See also Iranian Art and Architecture.
C | Music and Dance |
Iranian musical tradition is marked by
unique vocal styles and rich solo instrumental performance. Since the 1979
revolution, there has been a major revival of interest in Iranian traditional
and folk music, both of which are aired regularly on government-run radio and
television stations. Popular nationally known singers and performers of
traditional music include Hossein Alizadeh, Mohammad Reza Lofti, Shahram Nazari,
and Mohammad Shajarian. However, every town has locally famous singers.
Traditional musical instruments include the kamánche, or spiked fiddle;
the santur, a stringed instrument similar to the hammer dulcimer; the
setar, which resembles a lute; and the tar, an ancestor of the
guitar. Many Iranian musicians have acquired international reputations as
virtuoso performers of these instruments. The most popular folk troupes are
those performing Azeri Turkish, Kurdish, and Luri music, as well as Persian
seafaring songs from the Persian Gulf coast.
D | Theater and Film |
A type of passion play called
ta’zia, depicting events of Shia religious history, developed during the
Safavid era (1501-1722) and enjoyed great popularity during Qajar rule
(1794-1925). Influenced by increased European contact, playwrights of the 19th
and early 20th centuries wrote satires that often called for reform. During the
Pahlavi dynasty (1925-1979), plays were typically patriotic and pro-Western.
Since the 1979 revolution, which sought to promote Islamic values, the
government has encouraged playwrights but has prohibited plays considered
immoral or antireligious.
Iranian filmmakers produced the first
Iranian feature films in the early 1930s and have made more than 1,000 movies
since then. Iranian directors often also write the screenplays for their movies.
During the 1990s several Iranian films won awards at international film
festivals. Award-winning filmmakers include Bahram Bayzai, Abbas Kiarostami,
Majid Majidi, Mohsen Makhmalbaf, and Dariush Mehrjui. In 1997 Kiarostami's
Taste of Cherry won the prestigious Palme d’Or (Golden Palm) award for best
film at the Cannes Film Festival, and in 1999 Majidi’s Children of Heaven
was nominated for an Academy Award for best foreign film of 1998.
E | Libraries and Museums |
Of Iranian cities, Tehrān has the largest
number of museums, including Iran Bastan Museum (Museum of Ancient Iran), which
displays archaeological objects unearthed at Iran's pre-Islamic sites. Tehrān’s
museums also include Abgineh va Sofalineh Museum, a museum of glass art and
ceramics with hundreds of chronologically displayed exhibits, and the Museum of
Contemporary Art, which specializes in Iranian and international painting and
sculpture. Other major museums are located in Eşfahān, Mashhad, Qom, and Shīrāz.
Since 1979 the government has constructed museums in more than 25 provincial
capitals. The National Library of Iran, located in Tehrān, houses many valuable
manuscripts and historical documents. Public libraries exist in hundreds of
municipalities.
V | ECONOMY |
Although agriculture historically was the
most important sector of Iran’s economy, its share of the gross domestic product
(GDP) has been declining since the 1930s due to the rise of manufacturing.
Meanwhile, the mining sector, which is dominated by the production of oil, has
grown rapidly since Iran nationalized its oil fields in the 1950s. Factory
manufacturing has experienced periods of both rapid growth and stagnation. Trade
and commerce activities have expanded with the country's increasing
urbanization. During the late 1970s the Iranian economy appeared ready to grow
to a level on par with the world’s developed countries, but the 1979 revolution
and the subsequent eight-year war with Iraq strained all economic sectors.
However, the need to produce for the war effort actually spurred
industrialization, as did government spending on infrastructure development.
In the early 21st century the service sector
contributed the largest percentage of the GDP, followed by industry (mining and
manufacturing) and agriculture. About 45 percent of the government's budget came
from oil and natural gas revenues, and 31 percent came from taxes and fees.
Government spending contributed to an average annual inflation rate of 12
percent in the period 2006-2006. In 2006 the GDP was estimated at $218 billion,
or $3,108.50 per capita. Because of these figures and the country’s diversified
but small industrial base, the United Nations classifies Iran's economy as
semideveloped.
A | Government Role in the Economy |
Government planning plays an important role
in Iran’s economy. Since the late 1940s the government has designed and
implemented multiyear planning programs with the goal of industrial
diversification. After the 1979 revolution, the government continued the
industrialization that the shah had pursued but emphasized economic
self-sufficiency, which required greater investment in agriculture. However, the
flight abroad in 1978 and 1979 of most of the social and political elite, along
with their capital (estimated at more than $28 billion), combined with the
costly war with Iraq in the 1980s, left Iran’s economy severely damaged.
After the war, the Iranian government
declared its intention to privatize most state industries in an effort to
stimulate the ailing economy. The sale of state-owned factories and companies
proceeded slowly, however, and most industries remained state-owned in the early
21st century. The majority of heavy industry—including steel, petrochemicals,
copper, automobiles, and machine tools—was in the public sector, while most
light industry was privately owned.
B | Labor |
In 2006 Iran’s labor force was estimated at
29.1 million, of which women accounted for 34 percent. Unemployment stood at
about 15 percent. The agriculture and service sectors employed the greatest
number of workers. Although there are numerous government-affiliated trade
associations, there are no independent labor unions in Iran.
C | Services |
Urbanization has contributed to significant
growth in the service sector. In 2006 the sector ranked as the largest
contributor to the GDP (45 percent) and employed 45 percent of workers.
Important service industries include public services (including education),
commerce, personal services, professional services (including health care), and
tourism. The tourist industry declined dramatically during the war with Iraq in
the 1980s but has subsequently revived. About 1,659,000 foreign tourists visited
Iran in 2004; most came from Asian countries, including the republics of Central
Asia, while a small share came from the countries of the European Union and
North America. The most popular tourist destinations are Eşfahān, Mashhad, and
Shīrāz.
D | Agriculture |
Iran’s agricultural sector contributed 10
percent of the GDP in 2006 and employed 25 percent (2005) of the labor force.
Since 1979 commercial farming has replaced subsistence farming as the dominant
mode of agricultural production. Some northern and western areas support
rain-fed agriculture, while other areas require irrigation for successful crop
production. Wheat, rice, and barley are the country’s major crops. Total wheat
and rice production fails to meet domestic food requirements, however, making
substantial imports necessary. Other principal crops include potatoes, legumes
(beans and lentils), vegetables, fruits, sugar beets, sugarcane, fodder plants
(alfalfa and clover), nuts (pistachios, almonds, and walnuts), spices (including
cumin, sumac, and saffron), and tea. Honey is collected from beehives, and silk
is harvested from silkworm cocoons. Livestock products include lamb, goat meat,
beef, poultry, milk, eggs, butter, cheese, wool, and leather. Major agricultural
exports include fresh and dried fruits, nuts, animal hides, processed foods, and
spices.
E | Mining and Manufacturing |
The industrial sector—including mining,
manufacturing, and construction—contributed 45 percent of the GDP and employed
30 percent of the labor force in 2006. Mineral products, notably petroleum,
dominate Iran’s exports, but mining employs less than 1 percent of the country’s
labor force. Since 1913 Iran has been a major oil exporting country. In the late
1970s it ranked as the fourth largest oil producer and the second largest oil
exporter in the world. Following the 1979 revolution, however, the government
reduced daily oil production in accordance with an oil conservation policy.
Further production declines occurred as result of damage to oil facilities
during the war with Iraq. Oil production began increasing in the late 1980s due
to the repair of damaged pipelines and the exploitation of newly discovered
offshore oil fields in the Persian Gulf. By 2004 Iran’s annual oil production
was 1.4 billion barrels. Iran also has the world's second largest reserves of
natural gas; these are exploited primarily for domestic use.
Although the petroleum industry provides
the majority of economic revenues, about 75 percent of all mining sector
employees work in mines producing minerals other than oil and natural gas. These
include coal, iron ore, copper, lead, zinc, chromium, barite, salt, gypsum,
molybdenum, strontium, silica, uranium, and gold. The mines at Sar Cheshmeh in
Kermān Province contain the world's second largest lode of copper ore. Large
iron ore deposits lie in central Iran, near Bafq, Yazd, and Kermān.
Iran has a long tradition of producing
artisan goods, including carpets, ceramics, copperware and brassware, glass,
leather goods, textiles, and woodwork. Iran’s rich carpet-weaving tradition
dates from pre-Islamic times, and it remains an important industry. Large-scale
manufacturing in factories began in the 1920s and developed gradually. During
the Iran-Iraq War, Iraq bombed many of Iran’s petrochemical plants, and the
large oil refinery at Ābādān was badly damaged and forced to halt production.
Reconstruction of the refinery began in 1988 and production resumed in 1993.
However, the war also stimulated the growth of many small factories producing
import-substitution goods and materials needed by the military. The country’s
major manufactured products are petrochemicals, steel, and copper products.
Other important manufactures include automobiles, processed foods (including
refined sugar), carpets and textiles, pharmaceuticals, and cement.
F | Forestry and Fishing |
Although they contribute very little to
the GDP and employ a small percentage of workers, fishing and logging are
important industries in specific regions. Logging takes place primarily in the
forests of the Elburz Mountains, where various deciduous and conifer trees are
harvested for construction, furniture, pulp, industrial uses, and fuel. Fishing
fleets operate out of several ports on the Caspian Sea, the Persian Gulf, and
the Gulf of Oman. Caviar harvested from Caspian Sea sturgeon is an important
export item. Grouper, shrimp, and tuna caught in the Persian Gulf are important
for the domestic and export markets. Various species of rock lobsters are caught
in the Gulf of Oman.
G | Energy |
In the 1980s and 1990s Iran built several
new natural gas, combined cycle (using both gas and steam), and hydroelectric
power stations, dramatically increasing electric power output. Thermal plants
supply 93 percent of the country’s electricity, and hydroelectric facilities
provide most of the rest. In 1975 the government began building a nuclear power
plant at Būshehr, on the Persian Gulf coast. The partially completed plant was
bombed during the war with Iraq. In 1995 Russia signed an agreement to finish
construction of the plant.
H | Transportation |
Iran has an extensive paved road system
linking most of its towns and all of its cities. In 2003 the country had 179,388
km (111,000 mi) of roads, of which 67 percent were paved. There were 30
passenger cars for every 1,000 inhabitants. Trains operated on 7,131 km (4,431
mi) of railroad track. The country’s major port of entry is Bandar-e ‘Abbās on
the Strait of Hormuz. After arriving in Iran, imported goods are distributed
throughout the country by trucks and freight trains. The Tehrān-Bandar-e ‘Abbās
railroad, opened in 1995, connects Bandar-e ‘Abbās to the railroad system of
Central Asia via Tehrān and Mashhad. Other major ports include Bandar-e Anzalī
and Bandar-e Torkeman on the Caspian Sea and Korramshahr and Bandar-e Khomeynī
on the Persian Gulf. Dozens of cities have airports that serve passenger and
cargo planes. Iran Air, the national airline, was founded in 1962 and operates
domestic and international flights. All large cities have mass transit systems
using buses, and several private companies provide bus service between cities.
Tehrān and Eşfahān are in the process of constructing underground mass transit
rail lines.
I | Communications |
The press in Iran is privately owned and
reflects a diversity of political and social views. A special court has
authority to monitor the print media and may suspend publication or revoke the
licenses of papers or journals that a jury finds guilty of publishing
antireligious material, slander, or information detrimental to the national
interest. Since the late 1990s the court has shut down many pro-reform
newspapers and other periodicals. Most Iranian newspapers are published in
Persian, but newspapers in English and other languages also exist. The most
widely circulated periodicals are based in Tehrān. Popular daily and weekly
newspapers include Ettela’at, Kayhan, Resalat, and the Tehran
Times (an English-language paper).
The government runs the broadcast media,
which includes three national radio stations and two national television
networks, as well as dozens of local radio and television stations. In 2000
there were 252 radios and 158 television sets in use for every 1,000 residents.
There were 278 telephone lines and 109 personal computers for every 1,000
residents. Computers for home use became more affordable in the mid-1990s, and
since then demand for access to the Internet has increased. In 1998 the Ministry
of Posts and Telecommunications began selling Internet accounts to the general
public.
J | Foreign Trade |
Petroleum dominates Iran’s exports, making
up 85 percent of export earnings. In 2002 Iran exported 765 million barrels of
crude oil per day. Major nonoil exports include carpets, chemicals, steel, fresh
and dried fruits, nuts, and animal hides. The country’s leading purchasers are
Japan, South Korea, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Italy, and China. Since the
value of Iran's imports generally is less than the value of its exports, the
country maintained a favorable balance of trade for most years since the 1980s.
Principal imports include machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, iron and
steel, and food products. Primary suppliers of imports are Germany, South Korea,
UAE, Italy, and France.
Iran has had no direct trade with the
United States since 1995, when the U.S. government banned all commercial and
financial transactions between U.S. companies and Iranian public and private
entities. The United States took this action because it believed Iran was
planning to develop weapons of mass destruction and was supporting international
terrorism. Iran is a member of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
and the Economic Cooperation Organization (an organization promoting economic
and cultural cooperation among Islamic states).
K | Currency and Banking |
Iran’s unit of currency is the rial.
The official exchange rate averaged 9,171 rials to the U.S. dollar in 2006.
However, rials are exchanged on the unofficial market at a much higher rate. In
1979 the government nationalized all private banks and announced the
establishment of a banking system whereby, in accordance with Islamic law,
interest on loans was replaced with handling fees; the system went into effect
in the mid-1980s. The banking system consists of the central bank, which issues
currency; several commercial banks that are headquartered in Tehrān but have
branches throughout the country; two development banks; and a housing bank that
specializes in home mortgages. The government began to privatize the banking
sector in 2001, when it issued licenses to two new privately owned banks. The
Tehrān Stock Exchange trades the shares of more than 400 registered
companies.
VI | GOVERNMENT |
The Safavid dynasty established Iran as a
monarchy under a shah, or king, in 1501. Although the ruling dynasty changed in
the 18th century, the system of government did not change significantly until
1906, when a popular revolution forced the shah to accept a constitution that
limited his powers. The 1906 constitution remained law until 1979, but after
1925 it was ignored in practice by the Pahlavi dynasty shahs, who created a
highly centralized government over which they ruled as virtual dictators.
Beginning in the early 1950s, popular disaffection with arbitrary rule increased
gradually, culminating in the 1979 Islamic revolution. This revolution replaced
the monarchy with a republican form of government guided by the principles of
Shia Islam. Shia clergy who had played a key role in mobilizing opposition to
the shah obtained important positions in the postrevolutionary government. The
principal religious figure, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was accepted widely as
the country's leader even though he did not participate in the actual governance
of the country. He was succeeded by Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. Suspicious of
central authority, the new rulers created a system under which the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches of government were separate and could check
one another's exercise of power.
Although the clergy continued to dominate
the highest ranks of the government into the 21st century, it was divided into
liberal and conservative factions. Liberal clergy wanted to relax some of the
religious restrictions on Iranian society. At the beginning of the 21st century,
liberals under President Mohammed Khatami controlled the executive and
legislative branches, and conservatives controlled the judiciary and the
powerful Council of Guardians. In the parliamentary elections of 2004, however,
liberal and moderate candidates were barred from running, and conservatives took
control of the legislature. In the 2005 presidential election Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, a conservative known for his loyalty to Khamenei, was elected by a
large margin.
A | Constitution |
In the summer of 1979 a popularly elected
assembly drafted the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran; this
constitution was approved in a popular referendum in December. It named Khomeini
to serve as Iran’s supreme spiritual leader, an office called velayat-e
faqih (guardianship of the religious jurist; the holder of the office is the
faqih), and provided for an elected assembly of senior clergy to select
Khomeini’s successors. The constitution also stipulated as head of state an
elected president who would choose a prime minister to be head of government,
subject to legislative approval. It preserved the prerevolutionary elected
parliament, the Majlis, as the legislature. In 1989 voters approved 45
amendments to the constitution, the most important of which downgraded the
religious qualifications for the faqih, eliminated the office of prime minister,
and made the president both head of state and head of government. The Majlis set
15 as the minimum age for voting.
B | Velayat-e Faqih |
The faqih generally oversees the operation
of the government to ensure that its policies and actions conform to Islamic
principles. The faqih is a spiritual leader whose religious authority is above
that of the president and any other officials. However, in keeping with the
practice established by Khomeini, the faqih is expected to refrain from
involvement in the day-to-day affairs of governance. An 83-member Assembly of
Experts, popularly elected every eight years, is responsible for choosing the
faqih (or a council of three to five faqihs, if there is no consensus on a
single faqih) from among the most politically and religiously qualified Shia
clergy.
C | Executive |
The chief executive and head of state is
the president, who is elected to a four-year term and may be reelected to one
additional term. The president may appoint as many vice presidents as he deems
appropriate; he also appoints a cabinet of ministers. Vice presidents do not
need legislative approval, but all cabinet ministers chosen by the president
must receive a confirmation vote from the Majlis. The faqih is empowered to
dismiss a president who has been impeached by the Majlis.
D | Legislature |
Legislative authority is vested in the
Majlis, a single-chamber parliament. Its 290 members, 5 of whom represent
non-Muslim religious minorities, are popularly elected for four-year terms. The
Majlis can force the dismissal of cabinet ministers by no-confidence votes and
can impeach the president for misconduct in office. Although the executive
proposes most laws, individual deputies of the Majlis also may introduce
legislation. Deputies also may propose amendments to bills being debated.
E | Council of Guardians |
A 12-member Council of Guardians ensures
that all legislation enacted by the Majlis conforms to Islamic principles and
the constitution. The Council of Guardians also approves candidates for
presidential, legislative, and other elections. In 1997 the
conservative-controlled Council of Guardians used this power to disqualify many
liberal candidates from the election to the Assembly of Experts. Members of the
Council of Guardians serve six-year terms. Six of the members must be clergymen
appointed by the faqih, and six must be Muslim lawyers nominated by the
judiciary and approved by the Majlis. Conflicts between the Council of Guardians
and the more secular Majlis led Khomeini in 1988 to create the Expediency
Council, a body charged with resolving legislative disputes. The Expediency
Council has the power to override legislative acts and presidential decisions.
F | Judiciary |
Islamic law was introduced into Iran’s
legal system following the Islamic revolution of 1979. The country’s highest
judicial body is the Supreme Council of Justice, a five-member group of senior
clergy that supervises the appointment of all judges and codifies Islamic law.
The council also drafts all legislation pertaining to civil and criminal
offenses; the Majlis then debates the drafts and may amend any proposed bill
before voting to accept or reject it. The faqih appoints the head of the Supreme
Council of Justice; constitutional amendments passed in 1989 combined this
office with that of chief justice of the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court reviews decisions of
the lower courts and renders judgments regarding their conformity to Islamic
legal principles and the constitution. There are three types of lower courts in
Iran: revolutionary, civil, and criminal. Revolutionary courts try cases
involving antirevolutionary behavior, a broadly defined category that includes
crimes ranging from plots to overthrow the government by violent means to
trafficking in illegal drugs. Civil courts hear suits involving disputes between
individuals or corporate entities. Criminal courts deal with murder and theft.
In addition, there are special administrative courts, such as the Court of the
Clergy and the Press Court, that hear cases of professional misconduct.
Responsibility for the administration of courts is vested in the Ministry of
Justice. More than 100 crimes—including murder, drug trafficking, spying,
terrorism, treason, rape, adultery, and corruption—carry the possibility of a
death sentence.
G | Local Government |
Iran is divided into 28 provinces, each
headed by a governor appointed by the Ministry of Interior. The provinces are
further divided into counties, each headed by an executive appointed by the
Ministry of Interior on the recommendation of the provincial governor. Each
county includes two or more districts, which are headed by district
commissioners appointed by the county executive. The districts are subdivided
into urban municipalities and rural areas. Each municipality has an elected
council; the rural areas encompass a number of villages, each run by elected
village councils. The local councils have the power to regulate zoning and issue
building permits. They also organize the provision of, and assess fees for,
various public services.
H | Political Parties |
Political parties developed in Iran
during the 1940s. Most parties were banned after forces loyal to the shah
overthrew Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddeq and instituted martial law in 1953,
although many continued to operate secretly until the 1979 revolution, when they
reemerged openly. Immediately after the revolution, Iran’s leading clerics
established the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), which dominated politics until
it was dissolved in 1987 due to internal dissent. Following uprisings by several
opposition parties in 1981, new regulations made it increasingly difficult for
political groups to hold public meetings and recruit new members. An official
body was created to license political parties, but since 1987 it has recognized
the legal existence of only a few parties.
Nevertheless, the government tolerates
political activities by various associations that function as de facto parties
by endorsing candidates for legislative and presidential elections. One such
unofficial party, the Jamiyat-e Ruhaniyan Mobarez (Association of Militant
Clergy), generally supports legislation favorable to private business. The
Majma-e Ruhaniyat-e Mobarez (Society of Militant Clergy), which dominated the
Majlis from the late 1980s until 1992, advocates government regulation of the
economy and progressive income taxes to redistribute wealth equitably. The
Kargozaran-e Sazandegi (Servants of Construction), followers of former president
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, support a strong government role in development
projects. The Nezhat-e Azadi (Liberation Movement of Iran) stresses the need for
expanding and protecting civil liberties. The Hezb-e Mosha Karat-e Islami Iran
(Islamic Iran Participation Party), supporters of Khatami, stress the need to
create a civil society based on the rule of law.
I | Defense |
Upon the recommendation of the president,
the faqih appoints a joint chief of staff to coordinate the five branches of the
armed forces. These consist of an army (totaling 350,000 forces in 2004), an
internal security force known as the Revolutionary Guard (125,000), an air force
(52,000), and a navy (18,000). In addition, more than 300,000 men and women were
enlisted in a volunteer reserve force, the Basij. A two-year period of military
service is required of all male citizens of Iran aged 18 and older. The Ministry
of Defense exercises general supervision over the armed forces. In general, the
military is under the tight control of the civilian government, and armed forces
personnel are encouraged to avoid involvement in partisan politics.
J | International Organizations |
Iran is a charter member of the United
Nations (UN) and belongs to all of its specialized agencies. The country is also
a founding member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which
promotes solidarity among nations where Islam is an important religion, and the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Iran also belongs to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
VII | HISTORY |
For the history of Iran before the Muslim
conquest in the 7th century, see Persia.
Arab Muslim armies began their conquest of
the Persian Sassanian Empire in ad
636 and during the next five years conquered all of Iran, with the exception of
the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian coastal plain. They finally put an end to
the Sassanid dynasty in 651. For the next two centuries, most of Iran (which at
that time extended beyond Herāt in what now is western Afghanistan) remained
part of the Arab Islamic empire. The caliphs (successive Islamic leaders)
ruled initially from Medina in present-day Saudi Arabia, then from Damascus,
Syria, and finally from Baghdād, Iraq, as each city became the seat of the
caliphate. Beginning in the late 9th century, however, independent kingdoms
arose in eastern Iran; by the mid-11th century, the Arab caliph in Baghdād had
lost effective control of virtually all of Iran, although most of the local
dynasties continued to recognize his religious authority.
From the time of Islamic conquest,
Iranians gradually converted to Islam. Most had previously followed
Zoroastrianism, the official state religion under the Sassanid dynasty, but
minority groups had practiced Christianity or Judaism. By the 10th century the
majority of Iranians probably were Muslims. Most Iranian Muslims adhered to
orthodox Sunni Islam, although some followed various sects of Shia Islam. The
Ismailis, a Shia sect, maintained a small but effectively independent state in
the Rūdbār region of the Elburz Mountains from the 11th through the 13th
century. Iran's unique identity as a bastion of Jafari, or Twelver, Shia Islam
(which constitutes the main body of Shia Islam today) did not develop until the
16th century.
A | Turks and Mongols |
In the 11th century Turkic tribes began
migrating to Iran, settling primarily in the northwest. The Seljuk Turks (see
Seljuks), who had converted to Sunni Islam in the 10th century, defeated
local rulers and established dynasties that ruled over most of the country until
the Mongol invasions in the 13th century. Mongol rule proved disastrous for
Iran. The Mongols destroyed major cities such as Ardabīl, Hamadān, Marāgheh,
Neyshābūr, and Qazvīn, and they killed almost all of the inhabitants as
punishment for resistance. Ray and Tus, the largest and most important cities in
Iran, were destroyed by the Mongols and never rebuilt. The Mongols devastated
many regions, especially Khorāsān and Māzandarān, by destroying irrigation
networks and cropland. The harsh rule of the Mongols contributed to a continuing
economic decline throughout the 13th century.
Prior to 1295 Iran's Mongol rulers,
followers of shamanism or Buddhism, did not accept the Islamic faith. Their
official indifference or open hostility toward Islam stimulated the
transformation of Sufi brotherhoods into religious paramilitary organizations.
Although nominally Sunni, many of these brotherhoods became increasingly
tolerant of Shia ideas, even incorporating these ideas into their own belief
systems. In 1295 Mongol ruler Ghazan Khan, himself a convert to Islam, restored
Islam as the state religion, further bolstering the growth of new Islamic ideas.
Ghazan and his immediate successors also
adopted policies that reversed Iran's economic decline. In the late 13th and
early 14th centuries, cities that had escaped the destruction of the Mongol
invasions, such as Eşfahān, Shīrāz, and Tabrīz, emerged as new centers of
cultural development. However, from 1335 to 1380 civil strife weakened central
authority. Between 1381 and 1405 invasions by Turkic conqueror Tamerlane
destroyed more of Iran’s cities and undid most of the progress Ghazan had
achieved.
B | Safavid Rule |
During the 15th century several
competing families and tribes, mostly of Turkic origins, ruled over various
parts of Iran. Notable among them were the Safavids, who headed a militant Sufi
order founded in the northwest by Shaikh Safi of Ardabīl in the early 14th
century. His descendant, Ismail I, conquered first Tabrīz and then the rest of
Iran. In 1501 he proclaimed himself shah (king), a title commonly used by
Iranian rulers in pre-Islamic times. This marked the beginning of the Safavid
dynasty and was the first time since the 7th century that all of Iran was
unified as an independent state. Ismail embraced Jafari Shia Islam, established
it as the state religion, and began to convert the largely Sunni population to
this Shia sect.
Ismail used the new religion to mobilize
armies against the Ottomans—Sunni Muslims who controlled a vast empire to the
west. Intermittent warfare between the Safavids and the Ottoman Empire continued
for more than 150 years as successive rulers of each accused one another of
heretical beliefs. Although this lengthy conflict helped shape Iran's identity
as a Shia country, the real conflict between the Safavids and the Ottomans was
over territory, especially the Zagros Mountains region and the fertile plains of
present-day Iraq. In 1509 Ismail gained control of the Iraqi territory, but it
fell into Ottoman hands when Ottoman ruler Süleyman I conquered Baghdād in 1534.
After several unsuccessful campaigns,
the Safavids finally recaptured Baghdād in 1623 under Abbas I. (They held the
city for 15 years before the Ottomans gained permanent control in 1638.) During
his reign, Abbas moved the Safavid capital from Tabrīz, which was dangerously
close to the Ottoman border and had been occupied briefly by the Ottomans, to
the centrally located city of Eşfahān. He embellished Eşfahān with many bridges,
mosques, palaces, and schools. Most of these structures still stand, and they
are among the best-preserved examples of Islamic architecture in the world.
Abbas also encouraged trade with Europe, especially England and The Netherlands,
whose merchants bought Iranian carpets, silk, and textiles.
The Safavid empire gradually declined
after the reign of Abbas II ended in 1666. To finance lavish personal
lifestyles, later shahs imposed heavy taxes that discouraged investment and
encouraged corruption among officials. Shah Sultan Hosain, who ruled from 1694
to 1722, tried to convert forcibly his Afghan subjects in eastern Iran from
Sunni to Shia Islam. In response, an Afghan army under Mir Mahmud rebelled,
marching across eastern Iran and capturing the Safavid capital of Eşfahān. After
a brief siege of the city, the Afghan army executed the shah in 1722, thus
ending Safavid rule of Iran. The sudden dissolution of the empire plunged Iran
into a 70-year period of relative turmoil, marked by internal civil strife and
efforts by Ottoman and Russian forces to occupy border zones. Military leader
Nadir Shah, based in Mashhad, succeeded in freeing Iran from foreign occupation
in the 1730s and soon extended his rule eastward, but his empire collapsed upon
his assassination in 1747. Karim Khan Zand, based in Shīrāz, established a brief
period of tranquility in the mid-1700s but was not able to extend his control
over all of Iran.
C | The Qajar Dynasty |
In 1794 Agha Mohammad Khan defeated
numerous rivals and brought all of Iran under his rule, establishing the Qajar
dynasty. The Qajars were a Turkic tribe that held ancestral lands in present-day
Azerbaijan, which then was part of Iran. Agha Mohammad established his capital
at Tehrān, a village near the ruins of the ancient city of Ray (now Shahr-e
Rey). Agha Mohammad’s nephew and successor, Fath Ali Shah, ruled from 1797 to
1834. Under Fath Ali Shah, Iran went to war against Russia, which was expanding
from the north into the Caucasus Mountains, an area of historic Iranian interest
and influence. Iran suffered major military defeats during the war. Under the
terms of the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813, Iran recognized Russia's annexation of
Georgia and ceded to Russia most of the north Caucasus region. A second war with
Russia in the 1820s ended even more disastrously for Iran, which in 1828 was
forced to sign the Treaty of Turkmanchai acknowledging Russian sovereignty over
the entire area north of the Aras River (territory comprising present-day
Armenia and Azerbaijan).
During the reign of Mohammad Shah, from
1834 to 1848, Russia began expanding its political influence into Iran. Another
world power, Britain, also took interest in the region in order to protect its
growing empire in India. Because of Iran’s strategic location between the
southern borders of Russia and the westernmost borders of British India, both
Britain and Russia regarded an independent Iran as a convenient buffer area
between the two empires. At the same time, both powers preferred Iran to have a
weak central government so that they could more easily influence the country's
internal affairs.
Foreign interference and territorial
encroachment increased under the rule of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896) and his
son, Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-1906). Both men contracted huge foreign loans to
finance expensive personal trips to Europe. Neither ruler was able to prevent
Britain and Russia from encroaching into regions of traditional Iranian
influence. In 1856 Britain prevented Iran from reasserting control over Herāt,
which had been part of Iran in Safavid times but had been under non-Iranian rule
since the mid-18th century. Britain supported the city's incorporation into
Afghanistan, a country Britain helped create in order to extend eastward the
buffer between its Indian territories and Russia's expanding empire. Britain
also extended its control to other areas of the Persian Gulf during the 19th
century. Meanwhile, by 1881 Russia had completed its conquest of present-day
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, bringing Russia’s frontier to Iran's northeastern
borders and severing historic Iranian ties to the cities of Bukhara (Bukhoro)
and Samarqand. Several trade concessions by the Iranian government put economic
affairs largely under British control. By the late 19th century, many Iranians
believed that their rulers were beholden to foreign interests.
C1 | The Constitutional Revolution |
During the early 1900s the idea
gradually spread among Iranians that the only effective way to save the country
from government corruption and foreign manipulation was to make the shah
accountable to a written code of laws. By 1905 this sentiment had grown into a
popular movement, the Constitutional Revolution. Following a year of
demonstrations and strikes, Muzaffar al-Din Shah was forced to agree to the
creation of an elected parliament (the Majlis) and a constitution that limited
royal power, established a parliamentary system of government, and outlined the
powers of the legislature.
Britain and Russia, apparently fearing
that a strong Iranian government might act too independently and threaten their
interests in the region, agreed in 1907 to divide Iran into spheres in which
each would exercise exclusive influence. Russia then encouraged Mohammad Ali
Shah, Muzaffar’s successor who resented the constitutional limits on his
authority, to dissolve the Majlis. In 1908 the shah attempted a coup against the
elected government, bombing the Majlis building and dissolving the assembly.
After a year of fighting between supporters of the constitution and forces loyal
to the shah, the constitutionalists prevailed and deposed Mohammad Ali, who fled
to Russia. His young son Ahmad Shah, vowing to respect the constitution, was
installed under a regent.
The restoration of the Majlis and
constitutional government failed to end foreign influence in Iran. In 1901 a
British subject had been granted an exclusive 60-year concession to explore Iran
for oil. Commercially valuable quantities of oil were discovered in southwestern
Iran in 1908, and exports began in 1911. In 1914 the British government
purchased 51 percent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (formed in 1909; renamed
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, or AIOC, in 1935), and from then on behaved
increasingly like a sovereign power in southwestern Iran. Meanwhile, in 1910
Russia assisted Mohammad Ali Shah in an invasion of Iran and an unsuccessful
attempt to overthrow the government. The following year, Russia occupied Tabrīz
and forced the Majlis to dismiss American financial advisor William Morgan
Shuster, whom the Majlis had invited to Iran to reorganize the national
finances; Shuster’s reforms strengthened Iran but threatened Russian and British
interests.
C2 | World War I and Its Aftermath |
During World War I (1914-1918),
Britain and Russia, who were allies, launched attacks from Iran against the
Ottoman Empire, which was allied with Germany. Although Iran proclaimed
neutrality in the war, several battles were fought in western Iran between
Russian and Ottoman forces. These battles destroyed many villages, killed
several hundred Iranian civilians, and caused near-famine conditions that
probably caused the death of several thousand more. The inability of the Iranian
government to protect the country provoked rebellions and autonomy movements in
northern Iran between 1915 and 1921. The Russian revolutions of 1917 led Russia
to withdraw from Iran. The new revolutionary government also forgave all debts
that Iran owed to Russia.
Meanwhile, in 1919 Britain induced the
Iranian prime minister to sign a treaty giving Britain substantial political,
economic, and military control over Iran. This agreement would have made Iran a
virtual protectorate of Britain, and it aroused the anger of Iranian
nationalists. Opposition to the treaty in newspapers and popular demonstrations
dissuaded successive governments from submitting it to the Majlis for
ratification. By 1921 both Britain and Iran had let the draft treaty quietly
die.
D | Reza Shah Pahlavi |
The continuing political strife in Iran
alarmed many nationalists, including Reza Khan (later Reza Shah Pahlavi), an
officer in Iran’s only military force, the Cossack Brigade. Joining a newspaper
publisher known for his admiration of British political institutions, Reza Khan
used his troops in 1921 to support a coup against the government. Within four
years he had established himself as the most powerful person in the country by
suppressing rebellions and establishing order. In 1925 a specially convened
assembly deposed Ahmad Shah, the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty, and named Reza
Khan, who earlier had adopted the surname Pahlavi, as the new shah.
Reza Shah had ambitious plans for what
he called the modernization of Iran. These included developing large-scale
industries, implementing major infrastructure projects, building a cross-country
railroad system, establishing a national public education system, reforming the
judiciary, and improving health care. He believed only a strong, centralized
government managed by educated personnel could carry out his plans. He sent
hundreds of Iranians, including his own son, to Europe for training. Between
1925 and 1941 Reza Shah’s numerous development projects transformed Iran.
Industrialization, urbanization, and public education progressed rapidly, and
new social classes—a professional middle class and an industrial working
class—emerged. However, by the mid-1930s Reza Shah's dictatorial style of rule,
including the harsh and arbitrary treatment of his opponents and restrictions on
the press, caused increasing dissatisfaction in Iran.
Throughout his reign, Reza Shah tried to
avoid involvement with Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR; formed from the Russian Empire in 1922). Although many of his development
projects required foreign technical expertise, he tried to avoid awarding
contracts to British and Soviet companies, believing—as did most Iranians—that
this would open the way for their governments to exercise influence in Iran.
Although Britain, through its ownership of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
controlled all of Iran's oil resources, Reza Shah preferred to obtain technical
assistance from France, Germany, Italy, and other European countries. This
created problems for Iran after 1939, when Britain and Germany became enemies in
World War II. Although Reza Shah proclaimed Iran's neutrality, Britain insisted
that the German engineers and technicians in Iran were spies with missions to
sabotage British oil facilities in southwestern Iran. Britain demanded that Iran
expel all German citizens, but Reza Shah refused, claiming this would adversely
impact his development projects.
E | World War II and Its Aftermath |
Following Germany's invasion of the USSR
in June 1941, Britain and the Soviet Union became allies. Both turned their
attention to Iran. In addition to their suspicions about the role of German
technicians in Iran, Britain and the USSR saw the newly opened Trans-Iranian
Railroad as an attractive route for transporting supplies from the Persian Gulf
to the Soviet Caucasus region. However, Iran's neutrality ruled out this option.
In August 1941, after Reza Shah again refused to expel all German nationals,
Britain and the USSR invaded Iran. They swiftly defeated the Iranian army,
arrested Reza Shah and sent him into exile, and took control of Iran's
communications and coveted railroad. In 1942 the United States, an ally of
Britain and the USSR during the war, sent a military force to Iran to help
maintain and operate sections of the railroad.
The British and Soviet authorities
allowed Reza Shah's system of political and press repression to collapse and
constitutional government to evolve with minimal interference. They permitted
Reza Shah's son, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, to succeed to the throne after he
promised to reign as a constitutional monarch. In January 1942 the two occupying
powers signed an agreement with Iran to respect Iran's independence and to
withdraw their troops from the country within six months of the war’s end. A
U.S.-sponsored agreement at the 1943 Tehrān Conference reaffirmed this
commitment. In late 1945, however, the USSR refused to announce a timetable for
its withdrawal from Iran's northwestern provinces of East Azerbaijan and West
Azerbaijan, where Soviet-supported autonomy movements had developed. Although
the USSR withdrew its troops in May 1946, tensions continued for several months.
The dispute, which became known as the Azerbaijan crisis, was the first case to
be brought before the Security Council of the United Nations. This episode is
considered one of the precipitating events of the emerging Cold War, the postwar
rivalry between the United States and its allies and the USSR and its
allies.
Meanwhile, Iran's political system
became increasingly open. Political parties soon developed, and the 1944 Majlis
elections were the first genuinely competitive elections in more than 20 years.
Reformist parties were determined to prevent a return to authoritarian rule by
the monarchy, while parties opposed to economic and social reforms tended to
ally themselves with the shah. Foreign intervention remained a sensitive issue
for all parties. Reformists accused conservative politicians of collaborating
with foreigners to preserve their privileges. With foreign troops withdrawn and
the Azerbaijan crisis resolved, British control of Iran's oil fields became the
central issue regarding foreign intervention. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
(AIOC), which was owned by the British government, continued to produce and
market all Iranian oil under the terms of the 1901 concession. The AIOC provided
a modest royalty payment, which was only a fraction of its annual profits, to
the government of Iran. As early as the 1930s, some Iranians began advocating
the nationalization of the country's oil fields; after 1946, this effort
developed into a major popular movement.
F | Mosaddeq and Oil Nationalization |
In the mid-1940s Mohammad Mosaddeq, an
Iranian statesman and a member of the Majlis, emerged as the leader of the oil
nationalization movement. This movement sought to transfer control over the oil
industry from foreign-run companies to the Iranian government. Throughout his
political career, Mosaddeq consistently advocated three goals: to free Iran of
foreign intervention, to ensure that the shah remained a democratic monarch and
not a dictator, and to implement social reforms. He believed ending foreign
interference was a prerequisite for success in other areas, and he was convinced
that as long as the AIOC controlled Iran's most important natural resource,
foreign influence was inevitable. Beginning in 1945 he led a successful campaign
to deny the Soviet Union an oil concession in northern Iran. Although he
resisted joining political parties, Mosaddeq agreed in 1949 to head the National
Front, a coalition of several parties that supported oil nationalization. Within
a year the National Front had members in cities and towns throughout the country
and had become adept at organizing mass political rallies.
Conservative political groups, backed by
the shah, opposed nationalizing the AIOC, partly because they believed such a
course would cause irreparable harm to relations with Britain and partly because
they distrusted Mosaddeq's populism. However, as the nationalization movement
grew, fewer and fewer politicians openly challenged Mosaddeq on the oil issue.
In an effort to forestall nationalization, the shah appointed military officer
Ali Razmara as prime minister in 1950. This move increased the scale of
demonstrations in favor of nationalization and against a government that
increasingly was denounced as a puppet of foreign interests. Razmara was
assassinated in 1951 after only a few months in office, and the more militant
supporters of nationalization applauded his death. Sensing the popular mood, the
Majlis passed a bill nationalizing the AIOC, then took the unprecedented step of
appointing Mosaddeq prime minister over the shah's objections.
In response to these events, Britain
enforced a blockade on oil exports from Iran, a move that deprived Iran of
foreign exchange. Although Iran had not relied on oil revenues prior to 1951,
Mosaddeq's development budget anticipated this income; its absence severely
hindered efforts to stimulate the economy and implement social reforms. Attempts
to secure foreign financial assistance proved unsuccessful because most
countries and international financial institutions feared offending Britain. The
escalating crisis also discouraged private investment inside Iran. Mosaddeq,
like many other Iranian political leaders, hoped the United States would
intervene to resolve the crisis. Initially, the United States tried to mediate a
compromise. By 1952 it had persuaded Britain to accept the principle of oil
nationalization. However, the various diplomatic efforts ultimately failed to
resolve the dispute.
In early 1953, when a new administration
came to power in the United States, U.S. policy toward Iran began to change. The
United States now became sympathetic to British arguments that Mosaddeq's
government was causing instability that could be exploited by the USSR to expand
its regional influence. As the Cold War escalated, world superpowers began to
interpret political developments around the globe as “wins” or “losses” for the
U.S.-led Western bloc and the Soviet-led Eastern bloc. Although Mosaddeq
advocated Iranian neutrality in the Cold War conflict, neither side wanted to
“lose” Iran. Consequently, the United States decided to use its Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help overthrow Mosaddeq. By this time, many
conservative politicians in Iran, some senior military officers, and the shah
were prepared to work with the CIA to bring down the Mosaddeq government. The
coup, carried out in August 1953, failed initially, and the shah was forced to
flee the country. After several days of street fighting in Tehrān, which were
instigated by the CIA, army officers loyal to the shah gained the upper hand.
Mosaddeq was arrested, and the shah returned in triumph.
The Iranian government restored
relations with Britain in 1953 and concluded a new oil agreement the following
year. Under the new agreement, the concession formerly held by the AIOC passed
to a consortium of British, Dutch, French, and U.S. oil companies; this
consortium was to share the profits of oil operations in Iran with the Iranian
government. Although the agreement increased Iran’s share of the oil profits,
production levels and sale price remained under foreign control.
G | Mohammad Reza Shah’s Consolidation of Power |
Although he had succeeded his father as
shah in 1941, prior to 1953 Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had been overshadowed by
Mosaddeq and other politicians and seemed destined to remain a passive,
constitutional monarch. Following the coup, however, he moved to consolidate
power in his own hands. With the help of the military and later a secret police,
the Savak, the shah created a centralized, authoritarian regime. He suppressed
opposition by former National Front supporters and Communists, tightly
controlled legislative elections, and appointed a succession of prime ministers
loyal to him. In 1961 the shah dissolved the Majlis, instructing the prime
minister to rule by decree until new elections were held.
Initially, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
did not demonstrate the same enthusiasm for development and reform programs that
his father had shown. His early reforms were undertaken only with prodding from
the United States, which believed that dissatisfied Iranian peasants were
susceptible to influence by local agents of the USSR. In the early 1960s more
than 60 percent of Iran’s inhabitants were sharecroppers who received a
subsistence share (usually 20 percent) of the harvest from their landlords. A
land reform program implemented between 1962 and 1971 required landlords to sell
most of their land to the government, which then resold it to the peasants.
Although widely promoted as a major rural reform effort, only half of the
peasants obtained any land under the program, and about three-quarters of those
receiving land got less than 6 hectares (15 acres).
Mohammad Reza Shah took more interest in
industrial and public works projects, and between 1963 and 1978 numerous
development schemes contributed to an increase in industrialization and
urbanization. The shah presented his program as an integral part of a wider
reform effort known as the White Revolution, initiated to prevent a Red, or
Communist, revolution from originating at the grass roots level. The middle
class expanded, but much of the urban growth resulted from the migration of poor
villagers seeking city jobs. Consequently, slums proliferated on the outskirts
of cities. Government policy focused on the creation of modern industrial
facilities but neglected the development of social services. The construction
activity under the White Revolution stimulated expectations of political and
social change. Oil revenues tripled after 1973 due to higher prices and
increased sales, providing ready funding for the shah’s programs. However,
economic success only caused the shah’s regime to become more repressive as his
confidence in his rule grew.
H | Growing Opposition to the Shah |
Because of his collaboration with the
CIA to overthrow Mosaddeq in 1953, the shah was never able to overcome a popular
perception that he was merely a tool for foreign interests. Mosaddeq’s ouster
had shocked the nation, and over the years his image as a national hero had
grown stronger despite the fact that the shah’s government had banned any
publications that mentioned his name. Furthermore, because of the CIA’s role in
the overthrow, most Iranians saw the United States, even more so than Britain or
the USSR, as a threat to Iran's national interests. Strong relations between the
United States and Iran at the official level, especially an alliance whereby the
United States assisted in the buildup of Iran's military, fed the public’s
fears. In the early 1960s the shah's government drafted legislation granting
diplomatic status to U.S. military personnel stationed in Iran. Nationalists
denounced the bill as a reversion to the detested extraterritorial legal
privileges accorded to British and Russian citizens in Iran before 1925.
One of the shah’s most vocal opponents
was the leading Shia scholar, or ayatollah, Ruhollah Khomeini. Khomeini
was arrested in 1962 after publicly speaking out against the bill, and his
arrest instantly elevated him to the status of national hero. Although released
the following year, he refused to keep silent. He instead broadened his
criticisms of the regime to include corruption, violations of the constitution,
and rigging of elections. Khomeini’s second arrest in June 1963 led to three
days of rioting in many Iranian cities; the military suppressed the riots only
after more than 600 people had been killed and more than 2,000 injured. Fearing
that Khomeini would assume martyr status if he were kept in prison or executed
for treason, the shah exiled him to Turkey in 1964. Khomeini eventually settled
in the Shia theological center of An Najaf in Iraq. From there he maintained
regular contact with his former students in the Iranian city of Qum. These
students formed the nucleus of a covert anti-shah movement that was growing
among the clergy. In 1971 Khomeini published a book, Velayat-e faqih,
that provided the religious justification for an Islamic government in
Iran.
The shah also failed to win mass support
among the secular middle class of professionals, bureaucrats, teachers, and
intellectuals. This social group, created as a result of his father’s reforms
and expanded during the 1960s and 1970s due to the shah’s own development plans,
tended to be highly nationalistic and looked back nostalgically to the Mosaddeq
period as an era of genuine democracy. Like the clergy and the religiously
inclined traditional middle class of merchants and artisans, the secular middle
class resented the lack of meaningful political participation and the close ties
the shah had established with the United States. They criticized the shah's
promotion of Iran beginning in the late 1960s as America’s security pillar in
the Persian Gulf region. Despite their commonality of views, the secular and
religious groups had distrusted one another in the 1950s and 1960s. The growing
severity of political repression during the 1970s gradually brought them closer
together, however, and by 1977 various secular and religious opposition
movements were prepared to cooperate against the shah's regime.
I | The Islamic Revolution |
The spark that ignited the revolution
was a pro-Khomeini demonstration in Qum in January 1978. Police intervened, the
demonstration turned into a riot, and about 70 people were killed before calm
was restored. From his exile in Iraq, Khomeini called upon his followers to
commemorate the victims on the 40th day after their deaths, in accordance with
Iranian mourning customs. In February they held services at mosques throughout
the country, and demonstrations in Tabrīz turned into riots during which more
people were killed. Thus began a cycle of nationwide mourning services every 40
days, some of which turned violent and resulted in more fatalities. By late
summer, when it became clear that the government was losing control of the
streets, the shah imposed martial law on Tehrān and 11 other cities. This move
only escalated tensions. Employees in different industries and offices began
striking to protest martial law, and within six weeks a general strike had
paralyzed the economy, including the vital oil sector.
By October the strikes and
demonstrations were becoming a unified revolutionary movement. From the security
of his exile in Iraq, Khomeini continued to denounce the corruption and
injustices of the shah's regime, as well as its dependence on the United States.
His sermons were recorded, duplicated on thousands of cassette tapes, and
smuggled into Iran. The tapes appealed equally to religious Iranians and members
of the secular middle class. Alarmed by Khomeini’s growing influence, the shah
persuaded the Iraqi government to expel him. Khomeini immediately found asylum
in France, where access to the international media made it even easier for him
to communicate with supporters in Iran. In November the shah realized that the
army could not indefinitely contain the mass movement, and he began making plans
for his departure from Iran. He left the country in mid-January 1979. Two weeks
later, Khomeini returned to Iran in triumph after more than 14 years in exile.
On February 11, 1979, the royalist government was overthrown, and in a
referendum on April 1 Iranians voted overwhelmingly to establish an Islamic
republic.
J | Islamic Republic |
In February 1979 Khomeini asked Mehdi
Bazargan to form a provisional government. By spring the national solidarity
that had been so crucial to the ultimate success of the revolution had begun to
erode as various political groups competed for power and influence. The secular
parties had no leader of comparable stature to Khomeini and soon were
marginalized. Of the many religious groups, the most influential was the Islamic
Republican Party (IRP), formed by former students of Khomeini. Its principal
opponents were two nonclerical religious parties, the moderate Liberation
Movement of Iran, to which Bazargan belonged, and the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MK),
which espoused radical programs for the redistribution of wealth and tended to
be anticlerical.
Bazargan resigned in November 1979 in
protest over the hostage crisis (for more information, see the Hostage Crisis
and the Iran-Iraq War section of this article). In December voters approved
a new constitution. Khomeini, as faqih, or supreme spiritual leader, held the
highest authority in the country. In January 1980 voters elected Abolhassan
Bani-Sadr as the first president of the republic. Following parliamentary
elections in March, the Majlis and Bani-Sadr could not agree on a presidential
nominee for prime minister. In August Bani-Sadr reluctantly accepted the IRP
candidate, Mohammad Ali Rajai, as prime minister. The president and prime
minister clashed often, and in June 1981 the Majlis dismissed Bani-Sadr. Rajai
subsequently was elected president and chose IRP head Mohammad-Javad Bahonar as
his prime minister.
In June 1981 the MK, which had clashed
frequently with the IRP throughout 1980, launched an armed uprising against the
IRP-dominated government. The MK succeeded in killing more than 70 top IRP
leaders by bombing the party headquarters in late June. Two months later the MK
assassinated both Rajai and Bahonar. By mid-1982 the government had suppressed
the party through severe measures that included mass arrests and summary
executions of more than 7,000 suspected MK members. In 1983 the government
dissolved the communist Tudeh Party, leaving the Liberation Movement of Iran as
the only officially recognized party in opposition to the IRP. As internal
political stability returned, distinct ideological factions emerged within the
IRP. These internal rifts eventually would cause the IRP to dissolve itself in
1987. Meanwhile, elections in October 1981 brought Seyed Ali Khamenei, one of
the founders of the IRP and a member of the Majlis, to power as president.
J1 | The Hostage Crisis and the Iran-Iraq War |
Foreign relations played at least as
large a role as internal politics in shaping the new republic. The movement
against the shah had also been a movement against U.S. involvement in Iran. From
the outset the provisional government announced that Iran would no longer serve
American interests in the Persian Gulf and would discontinue all military
agreements with the United States. However, Khomeini and most government
ministers feared that the United States would intervene again, as it had in
1953, to restore the shah to power. After the shah was allowed entry into the
United States in October 1979, a group of Iranian students stormed the U.S.
embassy in Tehrān and took 66 Americans hostage. The United States responded by
freezing Iranian assets held by U.S. banks and imposing trade sanctions against
Iran. Thirteen hostages were soon released, but the students announced that the
remaining 53 would be released only when the United States apologized for its
support of the shah and sent him back to Iran to stand trial for his crimes.
They also demanded the return of billions of dollars they believed the shah had
hoarded abroad. When Khomeini endorsed the students' actions, the hostage crisis
ensued. After nearly 15 months, a settlement mediated by Algeria enabled the
hostages to return to the United States, which agreed to participate in a
tribunal based in The Hague, The Netherlands, to settle claims of U.S. citizens
and companies against Iran. The crisis resulted in a complete severing of the
once close relationship between the Iranian and U.S. governments and a deep
mutual suspicion of each other's international behavior.
In September 1980, in the midst of the
hostage crisis, Iraq launched a surprise invasion of Iran. Iraq wanted to
prevent the new Iranian republic from inciting Iraqi Shias to rise up against
the secular Iraqi regime (see Iran-Iraq War). The war, which continued
until August 1988 when both states accepted the terms of a UN-mediated
cease-fire agreement, took a toll on Iran. More than 170,000 Iranians were
killed, up to 700,000 were injured, 18,000 men were still listed as missing in
action eight years after the cease-fire, and nearly 2.5 million civilians fled
from the main battle areas in the western part of the country. Industrial
plants, businesses, homes, public buildings, and infrastructure suffered
cumulative damages in excess of $30 billion. The cities of Ābādān and
Khorramshahr, as well as several towns and hundreds of villages, were virtually
destroyed. Vital oil production and export facilities sustained heavy and
repeated damage. At the same time, the war created a sense of national
solidarity that helped the new government consolidate power, and it stimulated
the growth of numerous small industries producing goods for the war effort.
During the war, Iran gave refuge to more than 200,000 Iraqi nationals who fled
from their own government and absorbed more than a million Afghan refugees who
fled following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
J2 | Economic and Political Developments |
After the end of hostilities with
Iraq, the government of Iran implemented a series of five-year plans to promote
economic reconstruction and growth. Under these plans, the government has
rebuilt the war-devastated regions in the west and improved or built
infrastructure projects such as dams, electric power plants, hospitals,
highways, port facilities, railroads, and schools. Since 1989 there has been
intense political controversy over the government's role in economic
development. In general, politicians who favor a strong government role in
national economic planning have controlled the executive branch. The Majlis
often has opposed such government policies, either out of a conviction that the
plans ignored the lower classes or out of a desire to promote the interests of
private business.
The death of Khomeini in 1989 may have
contributed to the competition among the political elite. During the initial ten
years of the Islamic republic, Khomeini did not involve himself in routine
governmental affairs but rather served as an arbiter who suggested compromises
when the executive and legislative branches could not agree. Because of his
charisma and authority as leader of the revolution, politicians always deferred
to his suggestions. In the absence of a political figure of comparable stature,
political debates became more protracted, and compromises were more difficult to
achieve.
The Assembly of Experts chose
Khamenei, who would complete his second term as president that year, to succeed
Khomeini as faqih. Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, who had been speaker of the
Majlis from 1980 to 1989, won the 1989 presidential election and was reelected
in 1993. As president, Rafsanjani supported the “alternative thought” movement,
which advocated official tolerance of more diverse cultural and political views,
especially in the press. Mohammed Khatami, who served as minister of Islamic
guidance and culture under both Khamenei and Rafsanjani beginning in 1982,
crafted this policy. In 1992, after a more conservative Majlis was elected,
Khatami resigned, but he continued to serve as cultural adviser to President
Rafsanjani. Khatami's opposition to censorship and arbitrary government had wide
popular appeal that helped him win almost 70 percent of the vote in the 1997
presidential election. As president, Khatami continued to advocate political
reform and freedom of the press as essential for the creation of a civil
society. Khatami’s liberal policies met with opposition from conservatives who
distrusted popular government. The intense political competition between
liberals and conservatives was reflected in the press and in street
demonstrations. In 1998 two liberal politicians and three liberal writers were
killed in separate incidents that the Khatami government blamed on conservatives
in the Ministry of Information.
In February 2000 Iranian voters
favored pro-reform candidates in elections to the Majlis. The elections appeared
to provide a popular mandate for Khatami’s reform efforts. Accordingly, Khatami
was reelected president in June 2001 by an overwhelming margin. The conservative
elements of the government responded by blocking Khatami’s inauguration until
the Majlis approved two conservative nominees to the Council of Guardians.
A pro-Khatami reform coalition formed
a majority in the Majlis, but this coalition consisted of 18 separate political
parties that could not agree on a wide range of cultural and economic
policies. Thus, during its four-year tenure, the reform coalition failed to
enact legislation demanded by a majority of Iranians. In addition, all the
parties in the reform coalition shared a deep distrust of the people and failed
to broaden their essentially elitist parties into genuine mass political
organizations. Iranians demonstrated their disillusionment with the reform
coalition during local council elections held in the winter of 2003. Less than
15 percent of those eligible voted in Tehrān, and nationwide, only 30 percent of
the electorate bothered to vote. Candidates backed by the reform parties were
defeated all over the country.
Subsequently, in January 2004 the
Council of Guardians disqualified 2,600 out of 8,150 candidates who had
registered to run for the 290 seats in the Majlis in the February elections. The
reform coalition in the Majlis, including 87 incumbents who had been
disqualified, attracted international media attention by characterizing the
disqualifications as a setback for democracy.
Under pressure from Khatami and the
reformers, Khamenei tried to intervene by advising the Council of Guardians that
its procedures for reviewing candidates might be flawed if more than 40 percent
of the candidates were being disqualified. The Council of
Guardians eventually reinstated about 1,150 candidates, but none of the major
reform politicians who had been disqualified were reinstated.
Despite the disqualifications and
calls for a boycott by several reform parties, at least one reform candidate,
and in many constituencies several, contested each of the 290 seats. Most
reformers obtained less than 10 percent of the vote, however. Consequently, a
majority of the newly elected Majlis deputies were affiliated with one of the
conservative parties or were independents. Ironically, this new Majlis was
expected to be more receptive to economic and educational legislation designed
to help low-income families.
Seven candidates—three conservatives,
three reformers, and one moderate—contested Iran’s presidential elections in
June 2005, but none received a majority of votes, requiring a runoff between the
two leading vote-getters, former president Rafsanjani and the mayor of Tehrān,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. A member of the Developers Party, which opposes the free
market economic policies advocated by Rafsanjani and the reformers, Ahmadinejad
was regarded as the conservative candidate. But he ran a populist campaign that
underscored Iran’s high unemployment and the growing gap between rich and poor
as a result of economic programs enacted between 1997 and 2004. Ahmadinejad
called for restoring the spirit of the 1979 revolution by returning to its
ideals of social justice. He also called for using Iran’s oil revenues to
alleviate the plight of the poor and to benefit middle and low income groups,
rather than the wealthy. Ahmadinejad claimed the wealthy consumed most of these
revenues in the form of government contracts given out with no accountability or
oversight. Known for his loyalty to Khamenei, Ahmadinejad won handily with more
than 60 percent of the vote.
In parliamentary elections in March
2008, however, a potential challenge appeared to rise against forces allied with
Ahmadinejad. The challenge came from among conservatives, who reportedly
criticized the president’s handling of economic problems, particularly rising
gasoline prices and shortages. The Council of Guardians had effectively barred
most reformers from running in the elections, which resulted in protests from
abroad. Ahmadinejad’s allies won the most parliamentary seats but conservative
critics of the president won the second largest bloc of seats, followed by the
reformers. Political observers said the results of the parliamentary vote
signaled that Ahmadinejad might have a difficult time winning reelection in
2009.
J3 | Foreign Relations |
Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War,
Iran has also sought to improve its foreign relations. The protracted hostage
crisis with the United States had brought international disfavor upon the
Islamic republic. As a result, it had received little international support when
Iraq invaded in 1980 or during the long years of war. Furthermore, in 1989
Khomeini issued a fatwa that absolved of sin anyone who killed British novelist
Salman Rushdie, whose book The Satanic Verses (1988) many Muslims
considered offensive to Islam. The fatwa, which Rafsanjani said could not be
revoked, strained relations with Britain and other Western nations.
Nevertheless, Iran achieved normal relations with most countries under
Rafsanjani and Khatami, although there were intermittent periods of political
tension with European countries such as Britain, France, and Germany. In 1998
Iran’s foreign minister signed an agreement promising that the Iranian
government would not implement the fatwa. This prompted Britain to restore full
diplomatic relations with Iran. However, many conservative Iranian politicians
insisted the fatwa was still valid, and many organizations within Iran continued
to offer large bounties on Rushdie’s life.
Iran's leaders continued to distrust
the United States, which they perceived as hostile to their revolution.
Likewise, the United States remained deeply suspicious of Iran's regional
intentions, believing that Iran was intent on developing nuclear weapons and
supported international terrorism. The two countries had unofficial contacts in
the early 1990s but failed to resolve their differences. In 1993 the United
States, viewing Iran as a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East, adopted a
policy to prevent Iran from gaining too much regional power. In 1995 the United
States banned all U.S. trade with and investment in Iran, and in 1996 it drafted
a law placing sanctions on non-U.S. companies that invest in Iran. The 1996
legislation became a source of friction between the United States and its own
allies. Iran exploited the discord to expand its economic ties with Canada,
European Union countries, and Japan.
Khatami’s election as president in
1997 seemed to offer a chance for improved relations between the United States
and Iran. In 1998 the United States began to encourage nonofficial cultural
exchange programs with Iran and cooperation with the Islamic republic on
international issues of mutual interest, such as finding peaceful compromises
for the civil war in Afghanistan. United States-Iran relations seemed to improve
temporarily after the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001, which killed
nearly 3,000 people in the eastern United States. Iran encouraged its main
allies in Afghanistan to cooperate with the United States in overthrowing the
Taliban regime of Afghanistan, which had supported the al-Qaeda terrorist
network responsible for the attacks. Iran also cooperated in setting up a new
Afghan government. However, Iran and the United States continued to have serious
diplomatic differences regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In January
2002 Israel intercepted a ship carrying Iranian weapons to Palestinians fighting
Israel in the Gaza Strip. The U.S. administration of President George W. Bush
subsequently singled out Iran as part of an “axis of evil,” alleging that Iran
supported terrorist groups such as Hamas and also was pursuing nuclear weapons
aggressively.
Following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in
March 2003 and the election of a new parliamentary government there, Iran began
to enjoy improved relations with the Iraqi government. Several leaders of the
new government, in which Shia religious parties held a parliamentary majority,
had lived in exile in Iran during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). The improved
relations became most visible when Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is
also a Shia Muslim as are most Iranians, was warmly welcomed during a state
visit to Baghdād, the Iraqi capital, in March 2008, the first such visit since
the war between the two countries. The warm relations between the Iranian and
Iraqi governments alarmed many in U.S. ruling circles. U.S. military commanders
in Iraq accused Iran of providing sophisticated explosive devices to insurgents
battling U.S. forces in Iraq, a charge that Iran denied. See also
U.S.-Iraq War.
J4 | Iran’s Nuclear Program |
In December 2003 Iran signed an
additional protocol to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, giving the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) greater authority and broader access
to inspect Iran’s nuclear sites. The previous month the IAEA had noted with
“gravest concern” that Iran had enriched uranium and separated plutonium, both
of which are used in the making of nuclear weapons, at previously undisclosed
facilities. The additional protocol was expected to give the international
community greater assurance that Iran could not develop nuclear weapons
secretly.
In 2005 attention centered on Iran’s
uranium-enrichment facilities. The 1968 treaty guarantees member nations the
right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, such as for use in nuclear
reactors, but highly enriched uranium can be used to make nuclear weapons and is
prohibited by the treaty. In late 2004 the European Union (EU) sought to
negotiate an agreement with Iran. Iran agreed to suspend temporarily its
uranium-enrichment activities, pending a broader agreement under which the EU
would provide economic aid and concessions to Iran in return for a permanent
suspension of uranium enrichment. Negotiations were held during the first half
of 2005, but no agreement was reached. See also Nuclear Weapons
Proliferation.
Iran announced in February 2006 that
it had resumed its uranium-enrichment activities. In April 2006 Iranian
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had been elected in June 2005, revealed that
Iran had successfully enriched uranium to 3.5 percent, making it usable only for
nuclear power reactors. The achievement was regarded as a technical milestone.
It was reached by successfully operating a cascade of 164 gas centrifuges, the
devices used to enrich uranium in the uranium isotope 235 (U-235). U-235 is
fissionable, which means it can produce energy. Nuclear weapons experts said
that on the basis of its latest achievement, even if Iran was intent on
developing an atomic bomb, it could not yet produce sufficient enriched uranium
to manufacture a nuclear weapon. They noted that thousands of centrifuges
operating in a cascade are necessary to enrich uranium in the amount necessary
to make a nuclear bomb and that building such a cascade represented a
significant technical hurdle. Uranium must be enriched in the fissionable
isotope U-235 to more than 90 percent to make an atomic bomb.
An official with Iran’s Atomic Energy
Organization said Iran intended to have 3,000 gas centrifuges operating by March
2007. Iranian officials also said that Iran would continue to respect the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and would continue to cooperate with IAEA
inspectors to demonstrate that its nuclear program was for peaceful purposes
only. Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations (UN) said the country did not have
a nuclear weapons program and that Iran’s supreme spiritual leader, Seyed Ali
Khamenei, had issued a decree condemning such weapons.
Nevertheless, the April announcement
put Iran on a collision course with the United States and the European Union,
which had urged Iran to abandon its uranium-enrichment plans. President George
W. Bush said the United States did not want Iran to have “the capacity to make a
nuclear weapon.” The Bush administration’s 2005 national security strategy also
reaffirmed its preemptive military policy and cited Iran as the “single country”
that could pose the biggest threat to the United States.
The Bush administration argued
vigorously for the United Nations Security Council to impose stiff sanctions on
Iran. In December 2006 Russia and China, two permanent members of the Council,
agreed to a compromise resolution in which the Security Council imposed limited
economic sanctions on Iran. The resolution banned all countries from supplying
Iran with materials or technology that could be used in a nuclear weapons
program or for building missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It also
gave Iran 60 days in which to cease enriching uranium or else face further
sanctions. Iran rejected the resolution, saying it was being punished for
exercising its right to develop nuclear energy.
In March 2007 the UN Security Council
voted unanimously to tighten sanctions on Iran after a U.S.-led campaign charged
that Iran had failed to cease uranium enrichment and was supplying weapons to
insurgents in Iraq and to Hezbollah and Hamas, which the United States regards
as terrorist organizations. The new sanctions prohibited the sale or transfer of
Iranian weapons to any nation or organization. They also froze the overseas
assets of a number of Iranian citizens and organizations suspected of
involvement in Iran’s nuclear program and its Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran’s
elite military force. Iran again maintained that its nuclear program was for
peaceful purposes.
Tensions between the United States and
Iran continued throughout 2007. For a brief period the United States Navy
stationed two aircraft carrier battle groups in the Persian Gulf, where they
carried out war exercises. In October the Bush administration took the unusual
step of labeling the Quds Force, an elite unit of Iran’s military, the
Revolutionary Guard Corps, as a terrorist organization. It was the first time in
history that a unit of a nation’s regular military was labeled a terrorist
group. The administration imposed sanctions against the Quds Force, freezing any
assets it might have in the United States. Following the designation, Bush said
that it was very important to prevent Iran from obtaining the “knowledge
necessary” to develop nuclear weapons, warning that a nuclear-armed Iran could
lead to World War III.
Political observers noted that it was
the first time the administration had made a distinction between possessing
nuclear weapons and having “the knowledge” to develop them, an apparent
reference to Iran’s success in linking gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment.
Vice President Dick Cheney seemed to go even further when he said bluntly, “We
will not allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon.” Mohammed ElBaradei, director of
the IAEA, urged the Bush administration to “soften its statements” and give
diplomacy a chance to resolve unanswered questions about Iran’s nuclear program.
The IAEA had earlier issued a report that Iran was operating its
uranium-enrichment centrifuges at below capacity and that it had found no
evidence for a nuclear weapons program. ElBaradei maintained that even if Iran
had a secret program, it was still six to eight years away from developing a
nuclear weapon.
The escalating tensions led to a
surprise visit to the capital, Tehrān, by Russia’s president Vladimir Putin in
mid-October, the first visit by a Russian president to Iran since 1943. Putin
used the occasion of a summit meeting of five nations surrounding the Caspian
Sea to reject any calls for the use of military force in the region. All five
countries pledged that they would not allow their territories to be used to
launch a military attack against one another. Both Russia and China, permanent
members of the UN Security Council, initially rejected a call made by France and
the United States for a third round of sanctions against Iran. China has become
Iran’s leading trade partner. Under newly elected president Nicolas Sarkozy, the
French government has joined with the United States in suggesting that military
force might be necessary against Iran.
In December 2007, however, the U.S.
intelligence community reversed its 2005 assessment that Iran had a nuclear
weapons program. Instead, the new assessment by the 16 agencies that make up the
intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency, concluded
that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003. The new conclusions
were revealed in the “key judgments” finding on a national intelligence estimate
(NIE) report on Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Among the key judgments was the
finding that the Iranian government’s “decision to halt its nuclear weapons
program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have
been judging since 2005. Our assessment that the program probably was halted
primarily in response to international pressure suggests Iran may be more
vulnerable to influence on the issue than we judged previously.” The NIE found
that if Iran sought to develop nuclear weapons, it would use uranium enrichment
as the means to do so and would probably not be able to develop such weapons
before 2010 or 2013.
The revised NIE assessment followed an
IAEA report in November that concluded Iran was successfully operating 3,000 gas
centrifuges but was not enriching uranium at the level needed to develop a
nuclear weapon. The IAEA called Iran’s cooperation with nuclear inspectors
“reactive” rather than “proactive” and said its knowledge about Iran’s nuclear
program was “diminishing.”
The United States nevertheless
continued to pressure member nations of the UN Security Council to impose
additional sanctions on Iran for its uranium-enrichment program. In March 2008
the Security Council adopted a compromise resolution that froze the foreign
assets of 13 Iranian companies and imposed a travel ban on five Iranian
officials. Iran appeared to answer the sanctions by announcing the next month
that it had installed an additional 6,000 gas centrifuges at its nuclear complex
in Natanz for a total of 9,000 centrifuges. Some nuclear weapons experts,
however, reported that Iran was having difficulty operating its original 3,000
centrifuges and there was no evidence that it had mastered the technical
difficulties of enriching uranium on an industrial scale.
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