The Dred Scott case, formally known as Scott v.
Sandford, was one of the most important cases in American history. In a 7
to 2 ruling in 1857, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that African
Americans could not be considered citizens of the United States and therefore
had no right to sue in federal courts. Chief Justice Roger Taney, in denying
freedom to a slave named Dred Scott, issued the infamous statement that blacks
were “so far inferior that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.” The Court declared the Missouri Compromise, which prohibited slavery
in territories north and west of Missouri, invalid, and many historians believe
the court’s decision played a major role in bringing about the American Civil
War (1861-1865).
From Scott v. Sandford
Mr. Chief Justice Taney delivered the opinion of the court …
The question is simply this: can a negro whose ancestors
were imported into this country and sold as slaves become a member of the
political community formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights, and privileges,
and immunities, guarantied by that instrument to the citizen, one of which
rights is the privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the cases
specified in the Constitution?
It will be observed that the plea applies to that class
of persons only whose ancestors were negroes of the African race, and imported
into this country and sold and held as slaves. The only matter in issue before
the court, therefore, is, whether the descendants of such slaves, when they
shall be emancipated, or who are born of parents who had become free before
their birth, are citizens of a State in the sense in which the word 'citizen' is
used in the Constitution of the United States. And this being the only matter in
dispute on the pleadings, the court must be understood as speaking in this
opinion of that class only, that is, of those persons who are the descendants of
Africans who were imported into this country and sold as slaves …
It is not the province of the court to decide upon the
justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws. The decision of
that question belonged to the political or lawmaking power, to those who formed
the sovereignty and framed the Constitution. The duty of the court is to
interpret the instrument they have framed with the best lights we can obtain on
the subject, and to administer it as we find it, according to its true intent
and meaning when it was adopted.
In discussing this question, we must not confound the
rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits and the
rights of citizenship as a member of the Union. It does not by any means follow,
because he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State, that he
must be a citizen of the United States. He may have all of the rights and
privileges of the citizen of a State and yet not be entitled to the rights and
privileges of a citizen in any other State. For, previous to the adoption of the
Constitution of the United States, every State had the undoubted right to confer
on whomsoever it pleased the character of citizen, and to endow him with all its
rights. But this character, of course, was confined to the boundaries of the
State, and gave him no rights or privileges in other States beyond those secured
to him by the laws of nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several
States surrendered the power of conferring these rights and privileges by
adopting the Constitution of the United States …
It is true, every person, and every class and
description of persons who were, at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, recognised as citizens in the several States became also citizens
of this new political body, but none other; it was formed by them, and for them
and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal rights and privileges
guarantied to citizens of this new sovereignty were intended to embrace those
only who were then members of the several State communities, or who should
afterwards by birthright or otherwise become members according to the provisions
of the Constitution and the principles on which it was founded. It was the union
of those who were at that time members of distinct and separate political
communities into one political family, whose power, for certain specified
purposes, was to extend over the whole territory of the United States. And it
gave to each citizen rights and privileges outside of his State which he did not
before possess, and placed him in every other State upon a perfect equality with
its own citizens as to rights of person and rights of property; it made him a
citizen of the United States.
It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine who were
citizens of the several States when the Constitution was adopted. And in order
to do this, we must recur to the Governments and institutions of the thirteen
colonies when they separated from Great Britain and formed new sovereignties,
and took their places in the family of independent nations. We must inquire who,
at that time, were recognised as the people or citizens of a State whose rights
and liberties had been outraged by the English Government, and who declared
their independence and assumed the powers of Government to defend their rights
by force of arms.
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and
histories of the times, and the language used in the Declaration of
Independence, show that neither the class of persons who had been imported as
slaves nor their descendants, whether they had become free or not, were then
acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be included in the general
words used in that memorable instrument.
It is difficult at this day to realize the state of
public opinion in relation to that unfortunate race which prevailed in the
civilized and enlightened portions of the world at the time of the Declaration
of Independence and when the Constitution of the United States was framed and
adopted. But the public history of every European nation displays it in a manner
too plain to be mistaken.
They had for more than a century before been regarded as
beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white
race either in social or political relations, and so far inferior that they had
no rights which the white man was bound to respect, and that the negro might
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit. He was bought and
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic whenever a
profit could be made by it. This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in
the civilized portion of the white race. It was regarded as an axiom in morals
as well as in politics which no one thought of disputing or supposed to be open
to dispute, and men in every grade and position in society daily and habitually
acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public
concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.
And in no nation was this opinion more firmly fixed or
more uniformly acted upon than by the English Government and English people.
They not only seized them on the coast of Africa and sold them or held them in
slavery for their own use, but they took them as ordinary articles of
merchandise to every country where they could make a profit on them, and were
far more extensively engaged in this commerce than any other nation in the world
…
The language of the Declaration of Independence is equally conclusive:
It begins by declaring that, when in the course of human
events it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which
have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth
the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God
entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men
are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among them is life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness; that to secure these rights, Governments are instituted, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed.
The general words above quoted would seem to embrace the
whole human family, and if they were used in a similar instrument at this day
would be so understood. But it is too clear for dispute that the enslaved
African race were not intended to be included, and formed no part of the people
who framed and adopted this declaration, for if the language, as understood in
that day, would embrace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed
the Declaration of Independence would have been utterly and flagrantly
inconsistent with the principles they asserted, and instead of the sympathy of
mankind to which they so confidently appealed, they would have deserved and
received universal rebuke and reprobation.
Yet the men who framed this declaration were great men —
high in literary acquirements, high in their sense of honor, and incapable of
asserting principles inconsistent with those on which they were acting. They
perfectly understood the meaning of the language they used, and how it would be
understood by others, and they knew that it would not in any part of the
civilized world be supposed to embrace the negro race, which, by common consent,
had been excluded from civilized Governments and the family of nations, and
doomed to slavery. They spoke and acted according to the then established
doctrines and principles, and in the ordinary language of the day, and no one
misunderstood them. The unhappy black race were separated from the white by
indelible marks, and laws long before established, and were never thought of or
spoken of except as property, and when the claims of the owner or the profit of
the trader were supposed to need protection.
This state of public opinion had undergone no change
when the Constitution was adopted, as is equally evident from its provisions and
language.
The brief preamble sets forth by whom it was formed, for
what purposes, and for whose benefit and protection. It declares that it is
formed by the people of the United States—that is to say, by those who were
members of the different political communities in the several States—and its
great object is declared to be to secure the blessings of liberty to themselves
and their posterity. It speaks in general terms of the people of the United
States, and of citizens of the several States, when it is providing for the
exercise of the powers granted or the privileges secured to the citizen. It does
not define what description of persons are intended to be included under these
terms, or who shall be regarded as a citizen and one of the people. It uses them
as terms so well understood that no further description or definition was
necessary.
But there are two clauses in the Constitution which
point directly and specifically to the negro race as a separate class of
persons, and show clearly that they were not regarded as a portion of the people
or citizens of the Government then formed.
One of these clauses reserves to each of the thirteen
States the right to import slaves until the year 1808 if it thinks proper. And
the importation which it thus sanctions was unquestionably of persons of the
race of which we are speaking, as the traffic in slaves in the United States had
always been confined to them. And by the other provision the States pledge
themselves to each other to maintain the right of property of the master by
delivering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be
found within their respective territories.
By the first above-mentioned clause, therefore, the
right to purchase and hold this property is directly sanctioned and authorized
for twenty years by the people who framed the Constitution. And by the second,
they pledge themselves to maintain and uphold the right of the master in the
manner specified, as long as the Government they then formed should endure. And
these two provisions show conclusively that neither the description of persons
therein referred to nor their descendants were embraced in any of the other
provisions of the Constitution, for certainly these two clauses were not
intended to confer on them or their posterity the blessings of liberty, or any
of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen.
No one of that race had ever migrated to the United
States voluntarily; all of them had been brought here as articles of
merchandise. The number that had been emancipated at that time were but few in
comparison with those held in slavery, and they were identified in the public
mind with the race to which they belonged, and regarded as a part of the slave
population rather than the free. It is obvious that they were not even in the
minds of the framers of the Constitution when they were conferring special
rights and privileges upon the citizens of a State in every other part of the
Union.
Indeed, when we look to the condition of this race in
the several States at the time, it is impossible to believe that these rights
and privileges were intended to be extended to them …
Undoubtedly a person may be a citizen, that is, a member
of the community who form the sovereignty, although he exercises no share of the
political power and is incapacitated from holding particular offices. Women and
minors, who form a part of the political family, cannot vote, and when a
property qualification is required to vote or hold a particular office, those
who have not the necessary qualification cannot vote or hold the office, yet
they are citizens.
So, too, a person may be entitled to vote by the law of
the State, who is not a citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the
States of the Union, foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. And the
State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but that does not make
them citizens of the State, and still less of the United States. And the
provision in the Constitution giving privileges and immunities in other States
does not apply to them.
Neither does it apply to a person who, being the citizen
of a State, migrates to another State. For then he becomes subject to the laws
of the State in which he lives, and he is no longer a citizen of the State from
which he removed. And the State in which he resides may then, unquestionably,
determine his status or condition, and place him among the class of persons who
are not recognised as citizens, but belong to an inferior and subject race, and
may deny him the privileges and immunities enjoyed by its citizens.
But so far as mere rights of person are concerned, the
provision in question is confined to citizens of a State who are temporarily in
another State without taking up their residence there. It gives them no
political rights in the State as to voting or holding office, or in any other
respect. For a citizen of one State has no right to participate in the
government of another. But if he ranks as a citizen in the State to which he
belongs, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States, then,
whenever he goes into another State, the Constitution clothes him, as to the
rights of person, will all the privileges and immunities which belong to
citizens of the State.
And if persons of the African race are citizens of a
State, and of the United States, they would be entitled to all of these
privileges and immunities in every State, and the State could not restrict them,
for they would hold these privileges and immunities under the paramount
authority of the Federal Government, and its courts would be bound to maintain
and enforce them, the Constitution and laws of the State to the contrary
notwithstanding. And if the States could limit or restrict them, or place the
party in an inferior grade, this clause of the Constitution would be unmeaning,
and could have no operation, and would give no rights to the citizen when in
another State. He would have none but what the State itself chose to allow him.
This is evidently not the construction or meaning of the clause in question. It
guaranties rights to the citizen, and the State cannot withhold them. And these
rights are of a character and would lead to consequences which make it
absolutely certain that the African race were not included under the name of
citizens of a State, and were not in the contemplation of the framers of the
Constitution when these privileges and immunities were provided for the
protection of the citizen in other States …
No one, we presume, supposes that any change in public
opinion or feeling, in relation to this unfortunate race, in the civilized
nations of Europe or in this country, should induce the court to give to the
words of the Constitution a more liberal construction in their favor than they
were intended to bear when the instrument was framed and adopted. Such an
argument would be altogether inadmissible in any tribunal called on to interpret
it. If any of its provisions are deemed unjust, there is a mode prescribed in
the instrument itself by which it may be amended; but while it remains
unaltered, it must be construed now as it was understood at the time of its
adoption.
It is not only the same in words, but the same in
meaning, and delegates the same powers to the Government, and reserves and
secures the same rights and privileges to the citizen; and as long as it
continues to exist in its present form, it speaks not only in the same words,
but with the same meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the
hands of its framers and was voted on and adopted by the people of the United
States. Any other rule of construction would abrogate the judicial character of
this court, and make it the mere reflex of the popular opinion or passion of the
day. This court was not created by the Constitution for such purposes. Higher
and graver trusts have been confided to it, and it must not falter in the path
of duty.
What the construction was at that time we think can
hardly admit of doubt. We have the language of the Declaration of Independence
and of the Articles of Confederation, in addition to the plain words of the
Constitution itself; we have the legislation of the different States, before,
about the time, and since the Constitution was adopted; we have the legislation
of Congress, from the time of its adoption to a recent period; and we have the
constant and uniform action of the Executive Department, all concurring
together, and leading to the same result. And if anything in relation to the
construction of the Constitution can be regarded as settled, it is that which we
now give to the word 'citizen' and the word 'people.'
And, upon a full and careful consideration of the
subject, the court is of opinion, that, upon the facts stated in the plea in
abatement, Dred Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and not entitled as such to sue in its
courts, and consequently that the Circuit Court had no jurisdiction of the case,
and that the judgment on the plea in abatement is erroneous …
The case before us still more strongly imposes upon this
court the duty of examining whether the court below has not committed an error
in taking jurisdiction and giving a judgment for costs in favor of the
defendant, for in Capron v. Van Noorden, the judgment was reversed,
because it did not appear that the parties were citizens of different
States. They might or might not be . But in this case it does appear that
the plaintiff was born a slave, and if the facts upon which he relies have not
made him free, then it appears affirmatively on the record that he is not a
citizen, and consequently his suit against Sandford was not a suit between
citizens of different States, and the court had no authority to pass any
judgment between the parties. The suit ought, in this view of it, to have been
dismissed by the Circuit Court, and its judgment in favor of Sandford is
erroneous, and must be reversed.
It is true that the result either way, by dismissal or
by a judgment for the defendant, makes very little, if any, difference in a
pecuniary or personal point of view to either party. But the fact that the
result would be very nearly the same to the parties in either form of judgment
would not justify this court in sanctioning an error in the judgment which is
patent on the record, and which, if sanctioned, might be drawn into precedent,
and lead to serious mischief and injustice in some future suit.
We proceed, therefore, to inquire whether the facts
relied on by the plaintiff entitled him to his freedom.
The case, as he himself states it, on the record brought here by his writ of error, is this:
The plaintiff was a negro slave, belonging to Dr.
Emerson, who was a surgeon in the army of the United States. In the year 1834,
he took the plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock
Island, in the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month
of April or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the
plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort
Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the Territory
known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate
north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of
the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in slavery at said
Fort Snelling from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835, Harriet, who is named in the second
count of the plaintiff's declaration, was the negro slave of Major Taliaferro,
who belonged to the army of the United States. In that year, 1835, said Major
Taliaferro took said Harriet to said Fort Snelling, a military post, situated as
hereinbefore stated, and kept her there as a slave until the year 1836, and then
sold and delivered her as a slave, at said Fort Snelling, unto the said Dr.
Emerson hereinbefore named. Said Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at
said Fort Snelling until the year 1838.
In the year 1836, the plaintiff and Harriet
intermarried, at Fort Snelling, with the consent of Dr. Emerson, who then
claimed to be their master and owner. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third count
of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is about
fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, north of
the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie
is about seven years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, at the military
post called Jefferson Barracks.
In the year 1838, said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff
and said Harriet and their said daughter Eliza from said Fort Snelling to the
State of Missouri, where they have ever since resided.
Before the commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson
sold and conveyed the plaintiff, and Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the
defendant, as slaves, and the defendant has ever since claimed to hold them, and
each of them, as slaves.
In considering this part of the controversy, two
questions arise: 1. Was he, together with his family, free in Missouri by reason
of the stay in the territory of the United States hereinbefore mentioned? And 2.
If they were not, is Scott himself free by reason of his removal to Rock Island,
in the State of Illinois, as stated in the above admissions?
We proceed to examine the first question.
The act of Congress upon which the plaintiff relies
declares that slavery and involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime, shall be forever prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by
France, under the name of Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees
thirty minutes north latitude, and not included within the limits of Missouri.
And the difficulty which meets us at the threshold of this part of the inquiry
is whether Congress was authorized to pass this law under any of the powers
granted to it by the Constitution; for if the authority is not given by that
instrument, it is the duty of this court to declare it void and inoperative, and
incapable of conferring freedom upon anyone who is held as a slave under the
have of anyone of the States.
The counsel for the plaintiff has laid much stress upon
that article in the Constitution which confers on Congress the power 'to dispose
of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other
property belonging to the United States,' but, in the judgment of the court,
that provision has no bearing on the present controversy, and the power there
given, whatever it may be, is confined, and was intended to be confined, to the
territory which at that time belonged to, or was claimed by, the United States,
and was within their boundaries as settled by the treaty with Great Britain, and
can have no influence upon a territory afterwards acquired from a foreign
Government. It was a special provision for a known and particular territory, and
to meet a present emergency, and nothing more …
This brings us to examine by what provision of the
Constitution the present Federal Government, under its delegated and restricted
powers, is authorized to acquire territory outside of the original limits of the
United States, and what powers it may exercise therein over the person or
property of a citizen of the United States while it remains a Territory and
until it shall be admitted as one of the States of the Union.
There is certainly no power given by the Constitution to
the Federal Government to establish or maintain colonies bordering on the United
States or at a distance to be ruled and governed at its own pleasure, nor to
enlarge its territorial limits in any way except by the admission of new States.
That power is plainly given, and if a new State is admitted, it needs no further
legislation by Congress, because the Constitution itself defines the relative
rights and powers and duties of the State, and the citizens of the State, and
the Federal Government. But no power is given to acquire a Territory to be held
and governed permanently in that character.
And indeed the power exercised by Congress to acquire
territory and establish a Government there, according to its own unlimited
discretion, was viewed with great jealousy by the [p*447] leading statesmen of
the day. And in the Federalist No. 38, written by Mr. Madison, he speaks of the
acquisition of the Northwestern Territory by the confederated States, by the
cession from Virginia, and the establishment of a Government there, as an
exercise of power not warranted by the Articles of Confederation, and dangerous
to the liberties of the people. And he urges the adoption of the Constitution as
a security and safeguard against such an exercise of power.
It is a question for the political department of the
Government, and not the judicial, and whatever the political department of the
Government shall recognise as within the limits of the United States, the
judicial department is also bound to recognise and to administer in it the laws
of the United States so far as they apply, and to maintain in the Territory the
authority and rights of the Government and also the personal rights and rights
of property of individual citizens as secured by the Constitution. All we mean
to say on this point is that, as there is no express regulation in the
Constitution defining the power which the General Government may exercise over
the person or property of a citizen in a Territory thus acquired, the court must
necessarily look to the provisions and principles of the Constitution and its
distribution of powers for the rules and principles by which its decision must
be governed.
Taking this rule to guide us, it may be safely assumed
that citizens of the United States who migrate to a Territory belonging to the
people of the United States cannot be ruled as mere colonists, dependent upon
the will of the General Government and to be governed by any laws it may think
proper to impose. The principle upon which our Governments rest and upon which
alone they continue to exist, is the union of States, sovereign and independent
within their own limits in their internal and domestic concerns, and bound
together as one people by a General Government, possessing certain enumerated
and restricted powers delegated to it by the people of the several States, and
exercising supreme authority within the scope of the powers granted to it
throughout the dominion of the United States.
A power, therefore, in the General Government to obtain
and hold colonies and dependent territories over which they might legislate
without restriction would be inconsistent with its own existence in its present
form. Whatever it acquires, it acquires for the benefit of the people of the
several States who created it. It is their trustee acting for them, and charged
with the duty of promoting the interests of the whole people of the Union in the
exercise of the powers specifically granted …
But the power of Congress over the person or property of
a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power under our Constitution and
form of Government. The powers of the Government and the rights and privileges
of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself. And
when the Territory becomes a part of the United States, the Federal Government
enters into possession in the character impressed upon it by those who created
it. It enters upon it with its powers over the citizen strictly defined, and
limited by the Constitution, from which it derives its own existence and by
virtue of which alone it continues to exist and act as a Government and
sovereignty. It has no power of any kind beyond it, and it cannot, when it
enters a Territory of the United States, put off its character and assume
discretionary or despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to it. It
cannot create for itself a new character separated from the citizens of the
United States and the duties it owes them under the provisions of the
Constitution. The Territory being a part of the United States, the Government
and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the Constitution, with
their respective rights defined and marked out, and the Federal Government can
exercise no power over his person or property beyond what that instrument
confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved.
A reference to a few of the provisions of the
Constitution will illustrate this proposition.
For example, no one, we presume, will contend that
Congress can make any law in a Territory respecting the establishment of
religion, or the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech or of
the press, or the right of the people of the Territory peaceably to assemble and
to petition the Government for the redress of grievances. Nor can Congress deny
to the people the right to keep and bear arms, nor the right to trial by jury,
nor compel anyone to be a witness against himself in a criminal
proceeding.
These powers, and others in relation to rights of person
which it is not necessary here to enumerate, are, in express and positive terms,
denied to the General Government, and the rights of private property have been
guarded with equal care. Thus, the rights of property are united with the rights
of person, and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives
a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property merely because he came
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United
States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be
dignified with the name of due process of law.
So, too, it will hardly be contended that Congress could
by law quarter a soldier in a house in a Territory without the consent of the
owner, in time of peace nor in time of war, but in a manner prescribed by law.
Nor could they by law forfeit the property of a citizen in a Territory who was
convicted of treason, for a longer period than the life of the person convicted,
nor take private property for public use without just compensation.
The powers over person and property of which we speak
are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they
are forbidden to exercise them. And this prohibition is not confined to the
States, but the words are general, and extend to the whole territory over which
the Constitution gives it power to legislate, including those portions of it
remaining under Territorial Government, as well as that covered by States. It is
a total absence of power everywhere within the dominion of the United States,
and places the citizens of a Territory, so far as these rights are concerned, on
the same footing with citizens of the States, and guards them as firmly and
plainly against any inroads which the General Government might attempt under the
plea of implied or incidental powers. And if Congress itself cannot do this—if
it is beyond the powers conferred on the Federal Government—it will be admitted,
we presume, that it could not authorize a Territorial Government to exercise
them. It could confer no power on any local Government established by its
authority to violate the provisions of the Constitution.
It seems, however, to be supposed that there is a
difference between property in a slave and other property and that different
rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States.
And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon the
relation of master and slave and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers
which Governments may exercise over it have been dwelt upon in the
argument.
But, in considering the question before us, it must be
borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the
United States and their Government and interfering with their relation to each
other. The powers of the Government and the rights of the citizen under it are
positive and practical regulations plainly written down. The people of the
United States have delegated to it certain enumerated powers and forbidden it to
exercise others. It has no power over the person or property of a citizen but
what the citizens of the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of
other nations, or reasoning of statesmen or jurists upon the relations of master
and slave, can enlarge the powers of the Government or take from the citizens
the rights they have reserved. And if the Constitution recognises the right of
property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that
description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal,
acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction or deny to it the
benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been provided for the
protection of private property against the encroachments of the
Government.
Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this
opinion upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly
and expressly affirmed in the Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an
ordinary article of merchandise and property, was guarantied to the citizens of
the United States in every State that might desire it for twenty years. And the
Government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time if the
slave escapes from his owner. This is done in plain words—too plain to be
misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress
a greater power over slave property or which entitles property of that kind to
less protection that property of any other description. The only power conferred
is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his
rights.
Upon these considerations, it is the opinion of the
court that the act of Congress which prohibited a citizen from holding and
owning property of this kind in the territory of the United States north of the
line therein mentioned is not warranted by the Constitution, and is therefore
void, and that neither Dred Scott himself nor any of his family were made free
by being carried into this territory, even if they had been carried there by the
owner with the intention of becoming a permanent resident.
We have so far examined the case, as it stands under the
Constitution of the United States, and the powers thereby delegated to the
Federal Government.
But there is another point in the case which depends on
State power and State law. And it is contended, on the part of the plaintiff,
that he is made free by being taken to Rock Island, in the State of Illinois,
independently of his residence in the territory of the United States, and being
so made free, he was not again reduced to a state of slavery by being brought
back to Missouri.
Our notice of this part of the case will be very brief,
for the principle on which it depends was decided in this court, upon much
consideration, in the case of Strader et al. v. Graham. In that case, the
slaves had been taken from Kentucky to Ohio, with the consent of the owner, and
afterwards brought back to Kentucky. And this court held that their status or
condition as free or slave depended upon the laws of Kentucky when they were
brought back into that State, and not of Ohio, and that this court had no
jurisdiction to revise the judgment of a State court upon its own laws. This was
the point directly before the court, and the decision that this court had not
jurisdiction turned upon it, as will be seen by the report of the case.
So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into
the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back
in that character, his status as free or slave depended on the laws of Missouri,
and not of Illinois.
It has, however, been urged in the argument that, by the
laws of Missouri, he was free on his return, and that this case therefore cannot
be governed by the case of Strader et al. v. Graham, where it appeared,
by the laws of Kentucky, that the plaintiffs continued to be slaves on their
return from Ohio. But whatever doubts or opinions may at one time have been
entertained upon this subject, we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of
all the cases decided in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is
now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest court in the State that Scott
and his family upon their return were not free, but were, by the laws of
Missouri, the property of the defendant, and that the Circuit Court of the
United States had no jurisdiction when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff
was a slave and not a citizen …
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