I | INTRODUCTION |
Cuban Missile
Crisis, major confrontation between the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that occurred in 1962 over the issue of
Soviet-supplied missile installations in Cuba. Regarded by many as the world's
closest approach to nuclear war, the crisis began when the United States
discovered that Cuba had secretly installed Soviet missiles able to carry
nuclear weapons. The missiles were capable of hitting targets across most of the
United States. The discovery led to a tense stand-off of several days as the
United States imposed a naval blockade of Cuba and demanded that the USSR remove
the missiles.
II | BACKGROUND |
The crisis was the culmination of growing
tension between the United States and Cuba following the Cuban Revolution of
1959. The revolution ousted Cuba’s dictator, Fulgencio Batista and brought to
power a government headed by Cuban revolutionary leader Fidel Castro.
Prior to the revolution, the United States had
had significant influence in Cuba’s economic and political affairs, but the
Castro government refused to be influenced by the United States. Castro also
caused concern in the United States when he confiscated property belonging to
wealthy Cubans and foreigners in an attempt to implement policies to improve
conditions for poor and working-class Cubans. Many of these properties belonged
to businesses owned by U.S. companies.
Fearing that Castro would establish a
Communist regime in Cuba, the United States applied economic pressure, and in
1960 implemented an embargo that cut off trade between the United States and
Cuba. Castro refused to give in to the pressure. He responded by establishing
closer relations with the Communist government of the USSR. At the time, the
USSR and the United States were engaged in the Cold War—an economic, military,
and diplomatic struggle between Communist and capitalist nations.
In an effort to topple Castro’s government,
the United States trained and armed anti-Castro Cuban exiles living in the
United States. The exiles invaded Cuba in 1961, with a landing at the Bay of
Pigs. Castro’s army easily defeated the exiles. His victory during the Bay of
Pigs Invasion solidified Castro’s control over Cuba. Most Cubans resented U.S.
intervention in Cuban affairs and they rallied behind Castro, who declared that
Cuba was a Communist nation.
III | THE CRISIS EMERGES |
In 1960, as tensions mounted between Cuba and
the United States, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev began planning to secretly
supply Cuba with missiles that could deliver nuclear warheads to most parts of
the United States. Khrushchev mistakenly assumed that the United States would
take no action.
By 1962, however, concern was growing in the
United States over reports that the USSR was channeling weapons to Cuba. In
September, U.S. president John Fitzgerald Kennedy warned the Soviets that “the
gravest issues would arise” should they place offensive weapons (a phrase widely
understood to mean nuclear weapons) in Cuba.
On October 14 U.S. spy planes flying over
Cuba spotted the first ballistic missile. On October 16 U.S. intelligence
officials presented Kennedy with photographs showing nuclear missile bases under
construction in Cuba. The photos suggested preparations for two types of
missiles: medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM) able to travel about 1100
nautical miles (about 2000 km, or 1300 mi) and intermediate-range ballistic
missiles (IRBM) able to reach targets at a distance of about 2200 nautical miles
(about 4100 km, or 2500 mi). These missiles placed most major U.S.
cities—including Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York City—within range of nuclear
attack. Kennedy also saw evidence of nuclear-capable bombers.
Kennedy now faced a situation with
potentially grave consequences. However, he had no clear choice on the actions
to take against the Cubans and Soviets. He knew that an attack on Soviet
installations in Cuba risked touching off a global nuclear war that would result
in the loss of millions of lives. At the same time, he thought, and repeatedly
said, that he also risked war by doing nothing. If he ignored Soviet defiance of
his pledge in September to oppose offensive weapons in Cuba, then all U.S.
pledges might become suspect.
A U.S. promise to defend the beleaguered
city of West Berlin in Germany was already under severe pressure. Following the
allied victory in World War II (1939-1945), Berlin had been divided into East
Berlin, controlled by Communist East Germany, and West Berlin, governed by
capitalist West Germany. Earlier in the year Khrushchev had threatened to take
over West Berlin and told Kennedy he was willing to bring the matter to the
point of war. Khrushchev set a deadline of November 1962 for the resolution of
the issue.
Before the Cuban missile crisis began,
Kennedy and his advisers believed U.S. nuclear superiority would deter any
aggressive Soviet moves. But when the photographs of the missiles arrived,
Kennedy and his experts agreed that the weapons might have been placed in Cuba
to keep the United States from going to war over West Berlin. For Kennedy, doing
nothing about the missiles would only increase the danger in another
war-threatening crisis later in the year, this time over Berlin. The dilemma, as
Kennedy understood it, was acute.
IV | DEBATING THE OPTIONS |
Kennedy quickly assembled a small circle of
advisers, including both national security officials and others whose judgment
Kennedy prized. On October 16, the first day of the crisis, Kennedy and almost
all of his advisers agreed that a surprise air attack against Cuba—followed,
perhaps, by a blockade and an invasion—was the only reasonable response.
On October 18, however, former U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union Llewellyn Thompson suggested that Kennedy
announce a blockade as a prelude to an air strike. Kennedy’s advisers supported
a blockade, but not all for the same reasons. One group saw the blockade as a
form of ultimatum. Unless Khrushchev announced he would pull the missiles out of
Cuba, the blockade would be followed very shortly by some kind of military
action. Another group saw the blockade as an opening to negotiation. After his
advisers debated the options, Kennedy decided to go ahead with the blockade. At
the same time, the U.S. military began moving soldiers and equipment into
position for a possible invasion of Cuba.
Before Kennedy publicly announced the
blockade, he wanted to prepare both military and congressional leaders. On
October 19 he met in the Cabinet Room with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
president’s military advisory group. The Joint Chiefs favored an air strike and
an invasion, but Kennedy rejected their proposal, stating that an invasion could
escalate into a nuclear war. Kennedy met with congressional leaders on October
22. The legislators' opinions mirrored those held by Kennedy and the majority of
his advisers.
Following the meeting with congressional
leaders, Kennedy went on worldwide radio and television and announced the
discovery of the missiles. He demanded that Khrushchev withdraw them and said
that as a first step he was initiating a naval quarantine zone around Cuba,
within which U.S. naval forces would intercept and inspect ships to determine
whether they were carrying weapons. Kennedy warned that if Khrushchev fired
missiles from Cuba, the result would be “a full retaliatory response upon the
Soviet Union.”
Because international law defines a blockade
as an act of war, Kennedy and his advisers decided to refer to the blockade as a
quarantine. The United States was supported by other members of the Organization
of American States, an organization of nations in the western hemisphere that
seek to cooperate on matters of security and economic and social development.
V | WAITING FOR WAR |
The first days after the speech were consumed
with tension as Kennedy waited to see whether the Soviet ships would respect the
blockade or trigger a military confrontation at sea. For several tense days
Soviet vessels en route to Cuba avoided the quarantine zone, and Khrushchev and
Kennedy communicated through diplomatic channels. This cautious action postponed
any confrontation between the U.S. Navy and the Soviet freighters or the Soviet
submarines escorting them.
On October 26 Khrushchev sent a coded cable to
Kennedy that seemingly offered to withdraw missiles from Cuba in return for a
U.S. pledge not to invade the island, a pledge Kennedy had already volunteered
more than a week earlier during a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrey
Gromyko. Before Kennedy and his advisers could react, Khrushchev delivered a
public message in which he linked the withdrawal of the Cuban missiles to the
removal of “analogous” U.S. weapons in Turkey along the southern border of the
USSR. Khrushchev may have been emboldened to make this added demand by the fact
that the United States allowed some Soviet-bloc ships to pass through the
blockade. None of Kennedy's top advisers valued the U.S. missiles in Turkey,
which were considered obsolete. However, nearly all of them counseled against
removing the missiles in response to a Soviet demand, a demand they thought was
made in bad faith to derail any solution.
Meanwhile the United States faced the difficult
problems of maintaining the blockade and keeping track of the Soviet missiles,
which were camouflaged and moved soon after Kennedy's speech. Low-flying U.S.
surveillance aircraft encountered hostile fire, and on October 27 the Cubans
shot down a U-2, killing its pilot. The Kennedy administration debated the
question of whether or not to retaliate by destroying some air defense sites in
Cuba, but retaliation ran the risk of killing Soviet advisers and thereby
escalating the crisis.
Kennedy sensed that the U.S. public would
support removing the missiles in Turkey, but he did not want to appear to be
capitulating to Khrushchev's demand. Finally Kennedy decided his public reply
would only address Khrushchev's first message, which offered to withdraw the
missiles in exchange for a pledge not to invade Cuba.
At the same time, however, Kennedy planned to
privately assure Khrushchev that he intended to remove the missiles in Turkey.
The president’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, paid a secret visit to
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C., to
convey the president's pledge and its terms. If the Soviets disclosed the
assurance or intimated that the missiles in Turkey were part of the bargain, the
missiles would not be withdrawn, Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin. He also warned
the Soviets that time was running out and that the president would soon feel
compelled to attack Cuba.
By the time he received Dobrynin’s report,
however, Khrushchev had already decided to remove the missiles because the
danger of nuclear war was too great. Cuban leader Fidel Castro had sent
Khrushchev a message saying Castro believed a U.S. invasion was imminent and
that Khrushchev should be ready to launch the missiles. Khrushchev decided that
Kennedy was serious and that an air attack on Cuba and an invasion were at hand.
Khrushchev told his ministers that the missiles must be withdrawn from Cuba in
return only for a noninvasion pledge.
VI | RESOLUTION |
On October 28 the tension began to subside.
In a worldwide radio broadcast Khrushchev said he would remove “offensive”
weapons from Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade. He also called for
United Nations (UN) inspectors to verify the process. Kennedy believed
Khrushchev was sincere, but many of Kennedy’s advisers remained wary of the
Soviets' intentions.
A further problem developed when Castro
refused to allow UN oversight of the dismantling process. Eventually an
agreement was reached: The bombers would be removed within 30 days, and the
missiles and other “offensive” weapons would be evacuated in the open so that
U.S. surveillance aircraft could observe their removal.
VII | CONCLUSION |
In the years since the crisis, more details
about the incident emerged from declassified U.S. and Soviet files; from
conferences involving those who participated in the crisis, including some
Soviet officials; and from the release of secretly recorded White House tapes of
the meetings involving Kennedy and his advisers.
The facts that came to light revealed that a
U.S. invasion of Cuba might have met more opposition than the United States
expected. Unknown to the U.S. government, Soviet forces in Cuba had been
equipped with nuclear weapons intended for battlefield use. The United States
had also incorrectly estimated the number of Soviet troops stationed in Cuba.
Instead of a few thousand troops, there were about 40,000 Soviet soldiers in
Cuba. Any U.S. invasion would have faced stiff resistance.
The Cuban missile crisis was a very
dangerous episode, bringing the world’s major military powers to the brink of
nuclear war. Kennedy has been criticized for such policies as the failed Bay of
Pigs invasion, which helped cement the Soviet-Cuban relationship and led
Khrushchev to think Kennedy might be bullied. Yet most historians agree that it
was Kennedy's good judgment, and the prudence Khrushchev displayed once the
crisis intensified, that helped avert catastrophe.
The crisis led to a temporary strain in
relations between the USSR and Cuba. Castro felt he had been unfairly excluded
from the negotiations over the fate of the missiles, which he thought Cuba
needed to discourage a potential invasion from the United States. However, with
the threat of invasion removed by the U.S. pledge and with Cuba badly in need of
Soviet financial aid, relations between Cuba and the USSR soon grew closer.
The apparent capitulation of the USSR in the
standoff was instrumental in Khrushchev's being deposed as leader of the USSR in
1964. The younger Soviet leaders who ousted Khrushchev perceived his action
during the crisis as weak and indecisive. This perception, combined with other
foreign policy setbacks and difficulties meeting his goals for domestic
programs, contributed to his removal from power.
The Cuban missile crisis marked the point at
which the Cold War began to thaw. Both sides had peered over the precipice of
nuclear war and wisely decided to retreat. Khrushchev eventually accepted the
status quo in West Berlin, and the predicted conflict there never materialized.
The thaw also led to the signing of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1963
by Britain, the United States, and the USSR. The treaty outlawed nuclear test
explosions in the atmosphere or underwater, but allowed them underground.
No comments:
Post a Comment